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We present the linear type theory λ& as the formal basis for LLF, a conservative extension of
the logical framework LF. LLF combines the expressive power of dependent types with linear logic
to permit the natural and concise representation of a whole new class of deductive systems, namely
those dealing with state. As an example we encode a version of Mini-ML with mutable references
including its type system and its operational semantics and describe how to take practical advantage
of the representation of its computations. C© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
1. INTRODUCTION
A logical framework [27, 37] is a formal meta-language specifically designed to represent and reason
about programming languages, logics, and other formalisms that can be described as deductive sys-
tems. These frameworks consist of a meta-representation language with desirable computational and
representational properties, normally a logic or a type theory and of a meta-representation methodology
that suggests how to best take advantage of the underlying meta-language to encode a given formal
system. The logical framework LF [27] is among the most successful such proposals: it is based on the
dependent type theory λ, relies on the judgments-as-types representation methodology, and has been
implemented as the higher-order constraint logic programming language Elf [38, 41]. LF and Elf have
been widely used to study logical formalisms [43] and programming languages [33, 39] (see [44] for a
survey).
Unfortunately, many constructs and concepts needed in common programming practice cannot be
represented in a satisfactory way in meta-languages based on intuitionistic logic and intuitionistic type
theory, such as LF. In particular, constructs based on the notion of state as found in imperative lan-
guages often escape an elegant formalization by means of these tools. Similarly, logical systems that, by
definition (e.g., substructural logics) or by presentation (e.g., Dyckhoff’s contraction-free intuitionistic
sequent calculus [17], rely on destructive context operations require awkward encodings in an intuition-
istic framework. Consequently the adequacy of the representation is difficult to prove and the formal
meta-theory quickly becomes intractable.
Linear logic [21] provides a view of context formulas as resources, which can be exploited to model
the notion of state, as described for example in [12, 28, 34, 53]. The current proposals put the emphasis
on the issue of representing imperative constructs and resource-based logics, but appear inadequate for
reasoning effectively about these representations. For example, the linear specification formalism Forum
[34] has been used to give an immediate representation of the semantics of imperative programming
languages [12]; however, imperative computations are not effectively representable in this formal-
ism and therefore meta-theoretic properties have not been encoded. On the other hand, intuitionistic
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type-theoretic frameworks such as LF make the representation of meta-reasoning easy, but do not
have any notion of linearity built in. For example, the computations of the functional programming
language Mini-ML can easily be expressed in LF, which permits automating the meta-theory of that
language [33]. However, LF is not equipped to handle imperative computations as effectively, causing
the meta-reasoning task to become a major challenge [42].
In this paper, we propose a conservative extension of the logical framework LF that permits repre-
senting linear objects and reasoning about them. We call this formalism Linear LF or LLF for short. The
language underlying LLF is the dependent type theory λ&, which extends LF’s λ with the linear
connectives −◦ (linear implication), & (additive conjunction), and  (additive truth), seen in this setting
as type constructors. The language of objects of λ is consequently extended with linear functional
abstraction, additive pairs and unit, the corresponding destructors, and their equational theory. In order
to keep the system simple we restrict the indices of type families to be linearly closed so that a type can
depend only on intuitionistic assumptions, but not on linear variables. While at first this may appear to
be a strong restriction, the expressive power of the resulting system does not seem to be hindered by
this limitation.
The meta-representation methodology of LLF extends the judgments-as-types technique adopted in
LF with a direct way to map state-related constructs and behaviors onto the linear operators of λ&.
The resulting representations retain the elegance and immediacy that characterize LF encodings and the
ease of proving their adequacy. LLF has so far been used to encode the syntax of linear logic, sequent
calculus, and natural deduction presentations of its semantics, imperative programming languages and
their operational behavior, and a number of state-based games. We have also applied LLF to formalize
aspects of the meta-theory of these systems such as the proof of cut elimination for classical linear
logic, translations between linear natural deduction and sequent calculus, and properties of imperative
languages such as type preservation [6].
The principal contributions of this paper are (1) the definition of a uniform type theory admitting
linear entities in conjunction with dependent types; (2) a thorough meta-theoretical investigation of this
framework; and (3) the use of this system as a logical framework to represent and reason about problems
that are not handled well by previous formalisms, either linear or intuitionistic. To our knowledge,
λ& is the first example in the literature of a linear type theory with dependencies. The case of
simple types has been analyzed for example in [1, 2, 5, 32]. Subsequent work along the same lines of
thought has been proposed by Ishtiaq and Pym in [30]. Both type theories were inspired by ideas in
[35].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the linear type theory λ& on which
LLF is founded. It also presents major results in its meta-theory, such as the strong normalization
theorem and the decidability of verifying whether a term has a given type (type-checking) and of
computing a type for a given term (type synthesis). Finally, it describes a canonical formulation
of this language, which forms the basis for the meta-representation methodology adopted in LLF .
Section 3 demonstrates the expressive power of LLF as a logical framework by providing an encod-
ing of the syntax and the semantics of an imperative programming language and by showing how to
take practical advantage of the resulting representation of computations. Finally, Section 4 assesses the
results and outlines future work. Further details about the work presented in this paper can be found
in [6].
2. THE LINEAR TYPE THEORY λ&
In this section, we define the linear type theory λ& on which LLF is founded. More important, we
present the major results in its meta-theory that justify adopting it as a meta-representation language. In
order to facilitate the description of LLF in the available space, we must assume that the reader is familiar
with both the logical framework LF [27] and various presentations of linear logic [21, 22] and linear
λ-calculi [1, 2]. We will also take advantage of the natural extension of the Curry–Howard isomorphism
to linear logic by viewing types as formulas. Due to space constraints, we limit our discussion to
the main results in the meta-theory of LLF and, moreover, present only sketches of their proofs. The
interested reader is invited to consult [6] for further details about the presentation and the proofs in this
section.
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The discussion proceeds as follows: we first describe the syntax of λ& in Section 2.1. Then,
in Section 2.2, we introduce its semantics as a precanonical typing system, where typable terms are
expected to be in η-long form, although they may contain β-redices. In Section 2.3, we focus our
attention on the equational theory of this language. We present some basic properties in Section 2.4
and prove strong normalization for this system in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, we exploit this result to
simplify the precanonical presentation of the semantics of λ& as an equivalent algorithmic system,
which allows easy proofs of the decidability of type-checking and type synthesis. These properties
are presented Section 2.7. On the basis of these results, we devise in Section 2.8 a canonical system
for λ& whose only typable terms are both η-long and β-normal. The way λ& is used as
the language of the logical framework LLF relies on this formulation. Finally, in order to simplify
the treatment of the case study in the next section, we extend the concrete syntax of Elf, the major
implementation of LF, to the linear operators of λ& in Section 2.9.
2.1. Language and Basic Operations
The linear type theory λ& underlying LLF extends the language λ of the logical framework LF
with three connectives from linear logic, seen in this context as type constructors, namely multiplicative
implication (−◦), additive conjunction (&), and additive truth (). The language of objects is augmented
accordingly with the respective constructors and destructors. Linear types manipulate linear assumptions
which we represent as distinguished declarations of the form x :ˆ A in the context; we write x : A for
context elements a` la λ and call them intuitionistic assumptions. The syntax of λ& is given by the
following annotated grammar, where we have separated the constructs not present in λ with a double
bar ‖:
Kinds: K ::= TYPE (Class of types)
| x : A. K (Class of dependent type families)
Types: A :: = P (Base types)
| x : A1. A2 (Intuitionistic function types)
‖ A1  A2 (Linear function types)
| A1 & A2 (Additive product types)
|  (Additive unit type)
Type families: P ::= a (Type family constants)
| P M (Type family instantiation)
Objects: M ::= c | x (Object constants and variables)
| λx : A. M | M1 M2 (Intuitionistic functions)
‖ ˆλx : A. M | M1ˆM2 (Linear functions)
| 〈M1, M2〉| (Additive pairing)
FST M | SND M
| 〈〉 (Additive unit element)
Contexts:  ::= · (Empty context)
| , x : A (Intuitionistic assumption)
‖ , x :ˆ A (Linear assumption)
Signatures: 	 ::= · (Empty signature)
| 	, a : K (Type family constant declaration)
| 	, c : A (Object constant declaration)
Here x , c, and a range over object-level variables, object constants, and type family constants, respec-
tively. We adopt the convention of denoting linear variables with the letter u, possibly subscripted;
we will however continue to write x for generic variables. In particular, we write x : :ˆ A for a con-
text assumption whose exact nature (linear, x :ˆ A, or intuitionistic, x : A) is unimportant. In addition to
the names displayed above, we will often use N and B to range over objects and types, respectively.
Moreover, we denote generic terms, i.e., objects, types, or kinds, with the letters U and V , possibly
subscripted. As usual, we write A → U for x : A.U whenever x does not occur in the type or kind U .
Finally, an index is an argument Mi to a type family in a base type P = aM1 . . . Mn .
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s dot
· = ·  ·
 =  ′   ′′
s lin1
(, u :ˆ A) = ( ′, u :ˆ A)   ′′
 =  ′   ′′
s int
(, x : A) = ( ′, x : A)  ( ′′, x : A)
 =  ′   ′′
s lin2
(, u :ˆ A) =  ′  ( ′′, u :ˆ A)
FIG. 1. Context splitting.
The notions of free and bound variables are adapted from LF (notice the presence of a new binding
construct: linear ˆλ-abstraction). We denote with FV(U ) the free (linear or intuitionistic) variables of
a term U . We extend this notation to contexts and write FV() to denote the union of FV(A) for all
x ::ˆ A in . As usual, we identify terms that differ only by the names of their bound variables and write
[M/x]U for the capture-avoiding substitution of M for x in the term U ; note that x can be either linear
or intuitionistic. We extend this notation to contexts and write [M/x] for the result of substituting M
for x in the type of every assumption in . Finally we require variables and constants to be declared at
most once in a context and in a signature, respectively.
In the following discussion, we will as usual drop the leading empty sequence (·) from the repre-
sentation of a context. Similarly, we overload the context constructor (,) and use it to denote sequence
concatenation as well. We do not state or prove the usual properties of this operation. Whenever we
concatenate two contexts 1 and 2 we assume they do not declare common variables so that the
resulting context (1, 2) contains just one assumption for each declared variable. We denote with dom
 the domain of context , defined as the set of variables declared in it, and write |χ for the restriction
of  to the variables appearing in χ .
Below we will often need to refer to the intuitionistic part of a context . Therefore, we introduce
the function ¯, defined as follows:


·¯ = ·
, x : A = ¯, x : A
, x :ˆ A = ¯.
We overload this notation and use ¯ to express the fact that the linear portion of the denoted context is
constrained to be empty (e.g., in the all rules for type families in Fig. 3).
Multiplicative connectives in linear logic require the context to be split among the premises of a binary
rule (or the contexts in the premises to be merged in the conclusion, depending on the point of view).
We rely on the context splitting judgment to specify that the linear assumptions in a context  must be
distributed in the contexts 1 and 2, while the intuitionistic assumptions should be shared. Whenever
this is the case, the judgment  = 1 ✶2 is derivable. The rules in Fig. 1 define this judgment.
Notice that, whenever the judgment  = 1 ✶2 is derivable, 1 and 2 differ from  only by
missing linear assumptions. In particular, the relative order of the declarations still mentioned in these
contexts corresponds to the order in which they occur in . We anticipate that assumptions, either
intuitionistic or linear, cannot depend on linear variables in λ&. Therefore, splitting a context that
is valid according to the specifications in the next section yields two valid contexts. Similarly, merging
valid contexts having distinct names for their linear variables produces a valid context.
2.2. Precanonical Forms
The meaning of the syntactic entities of a language can be presented in various forms, the choice
being dictated by the aspects we want to emphasize. In this section, we define the semantics of λ&
by means of a deductive system that we call precanonical, which enforces derivable terms to be in
η-long form, although they might contain β-redices. The aim of the present section is to study the main
properties of the type theory underlying LLF, ultimately the decidability of type checking. Relying on
a precanonical system is particularly convenient for this purpose since it cleanly separates the practical
desideratum of having extensionality as part of our language, commonly expressed by means of η-
conversion rules, from the role of β-redices as the foundation of the equational theory of λ&.
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The main properties of LF were originally stated and proved for a type theory that did not enforce
extensionality, but whose notion of definitional equality was restricted to β-equivalence [27]. However,
the adequacy theorems that relate an object system to its LF encoding and the efficient implementation
of this formalism as a logic programming language require considering λ terms in canonical form.
Therefore, the type theory that is used as a meta-representation language is based on βη-equivalence.
This discrepancy was known to Harper et al. when they first presented LF in 1987 [27]. A full treatment
of the meta-theory of LF with βη-equivalence was successively devised by various authors [14, 20, 49]
and resulted in nontrivial complications.
The formulation of the semantics of LLF as a precanonical system has the advantage of forcing
all derivable judgments to mention only terms in η-long form, as formally expressed in Lemma 2.11.
Indeed, all the issues concerning η-conversion are hardwired into the system and do not required explicit
treatment. Consequently, the terms that we will ultimately produce are exactly the βη-long terms needed
in the adequacy theorems. That property allows us to focus on β-conversion and in particular to retain
the simple techniques used in [27], without the above mentioned anomaly. Our approach was inspired
by Felty’s canonical LF [18].
The precanonical system for LLF is specified by means of a number of judgments. We first have seven
judgments defining precanonical terms and the auxiliary notion of preatomic expressions, as well as
the natural extension of these concepts to contexts and signatures. The inference rules describing how
to derive them are distributed over Figs. 2 and 3. These rules will be discussed in detail shortly. The
shape of these expressions is reported here:
(i) p 	 ⇑ Sig (	 is a precanonical signature)
(ii) p	  ⇑ Ctx ( is a precanonical context in 	)
(iii) ¯ p	 K ⇑ Kind (K is a precanonical kind in ¯ and 	)
(iv) ¯ p	 A ⇑ TYPE (A is a precanonical type in ¯ and 	)
(v) ¯ p	 P ↓ K (P is a preatomic type family of kind K in ¯ and 	)
(vi)  p	 M ⇑ A (M is a precanonical object of type A in  and 	)
(vii)  p	 M ↓ A (M is a preatomic object of type A in  and 	)
Note that the judgments referring to types and kinds operate on purely intuitionistic assumptions,
expressed by using the notation ¯ for their context. We will gain in clarity and conciseness in the
following by relying on some abbreviations. Whenever the same property holds for each of the judgments
(iii–vii) when applied to terms of the appropriate syntactic category, we write  p	 U ⇑↓ V and then
refer to the generic terms U and V if needed. Moreover, if two or more such expressions occur in a
statement, we assume that the arrows of the actual judgments match, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
We take the liberty of adopting this notation also in the case of kinds, even though Kind is not a term
and there are no preatomic kinds. Whenever the judgment  p	 U ⇑↓ V has a derivation P , a fact that
we will sometimes write as P :: ( p	 U ⇑↓ V ), we will often refer to U as the term being validated
in this judgment, and call P a validation of U .
The notion of definitional equality we consider is β-equivalence and it operates at the level of objects,
type families, and kinds. Among the various possible presentations, we adopt parallel nested reduction
(→), defined in Fig. 4 and discussed shortly. We write →∗ and ≡ for its transitive closure and the
corresponding equivalence relation. We omit the obvious rules defining them. Cumulatively, we have
the following nine judgments:
(viii–x) U → V (U reduces to V)
(xi–xiii) U →∗ V (U transitively reduces to V)
(xiv–xvi) U ≡ V (U is definitionally equal to V)
We need one further ingredient to cope with the multiplicative type constructor −◦, namely the context
splitting judgment presented in the previous section and defined in Fig. 1.
(xvii)  =  ′ ✶ ′′ ( splits into  ′ and  ′′).
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We will now go through the rules defining λ& and describe the main ideas behind this formulation
of the semantics of our language. We first concentrate on the typing judgments in Figs. 2 and 3 and then
discuss the notion of definitional equality, founded on the reduction relation in Fig. 4, to be discussed
in the next section.
A term M of type A is in η-long form, or precanonical, if it is structured as a sequence consisting
solely of constructors (abstractions, pairing, and unit) that matches the structure of the type A, applied to
preatomic terms in those positions where objects of base type are required. A preatomic term consists of
a sequence of destructors (applications and projections) that ends with a constant, a variable, or another
precanonical term, where the argument part of each application is also required to be precanonical. Note
that this allows β-redices. This definition extends the usual notion on η-long forms of λ to the linear
type operators , &, and  of λ& without insisting on β-normal forms.
It is characteristic for η-long forms that the type alone determines the structure of a term until we
reach a base type, so, for example, any η-long term N of type A = a & (a  a) will have the form
〈N1, ˆλy : a.N2〉,
where N1 and N2 are preatomic terms of type a. A variable x of the above type A is preatomic, but not
precanonical. However it can be rewritten as
〈FST x, ˆλy : a.(SND x)ˆ y〉
which is precanonical.
Consider first the rules displayed in the upper part of Fig. 2. They validate precanonical objects M by
deriving judgments of the form  p	 M ⇑ A. Rules opc unit, opc pair, opc llam, and opc ilam allow
the construction of terms of the form 〈 〉, 〈M1, M2〉, ˆλu : A.M , and λx : A.M , respectively. These four
operators are the object constructors of our calculus. We call these inference patterns introduction rules
since, if we focus our attention on their type component, they introduce each of the type constructors of
λ& in their conclusion. The manner they handle their context is familiar from linear logic. Notice
in particular that opc unit (for ) is applicable with any valid context and that the premises of rule
opc pair (for &) share the same context, which also appears in its conclusion. These two are therefore
additive constructors, in the sense of linear logic.
Rules opc llam (for) and opc ilam (for →) differ only by the nature of the assumption they add to
the context in their premise: linear in the case of the former, intuitionistic for the latter. The two remaining
rules defining the object-level precanonical judgment leave the term in their central part unchanged. The
type conversion rule opc eq simply allows replacing the type component of a precanonical judgment
with another type, under the condition that it is valid and definitionally equivalent to the original type.
Rule opc a is the coercion from preatomic to precanonical terms. It is restricted to base types P . As
a result, there is exactly one rule for each type constructor and one rule for base type, if we ignore type
conversion for the moment. This guarantees the property stated above, namely, that the structure of a
precanonical term is determined by the structure of its type. Type conversion (rule opc eq) does not
destroy this property since it affects only objects embedded as indices in base types, as it will become
clear shortly.
The rules defining the preatomic judgment at the level of objects,  p	 M ↓ A, are displayed in the
lower part of Fig. 2. They validate constants (rule opa con) and linear and intuitionistic variables (rules
opa lvar and opa ivar, respectively). They also allow the formation of the terms M N , MˆN , FST M ,
and SND M (rules opa iapp, opa lapp, opa fst, and opa and, respectively), whose main operators we
call destructors. The latter four inference figures are called elimination rules since they permit taking
apart each of the type constructors of λ& from one of their premise, with the exception of . The
role played by linear assumptions in λ& is particularly evident in these rules. Indeed, an axiom
rule (opa con, opa lvar, and opa ivar) can be applied only if the linear part of its context is empty or
contains just the variable to be validated, with the proper type; this is expressed by using the · · · notation.
Linearity appears also in the elimination rule for −◦, where we rely on the splitting judgment defined in
Fig. 1 to manage the context for this connective in rule opa lapp. Observe also that the context of the
argument part of an intuitionistic application, in rule opa iapp, is constrained not to contain any linear
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Objects
 p
	
M ↓ P
opc a
 p
	
M ⇑ P
 p
	
M ⇑ B A ≡ B  p
	
A ⇑ TYPE
opc eq
 p
	
M ⇑ A
p
	
 ⇑ Ctx
opc unit
 p
	
〈〉 ⇑ 
 p
	
M ⇑ A  p
	
N ⇑ B
opc pair
 p
	
〈M, N 〉 ⇑ A & B
, u :ˆ A p
	
M ⇑ B
opc llam
 p
	
ˆλu : A. M ⇑ A −◦ B
, x : A p
	
M ⇑ B
opc ilam
 p
	
λx : A. M ⇑ x : A. B
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 p
	
M ⇑ A
opa c
 p
	
M ↓ A
 p
	
M ↓ B A ≡ B  p
	
A ⇑ TYPE
opa eq
 p
	
M ↓ A
p
	,c:A,	′  ⇑ Ctx
opa con
 p
	,c:A,	′ c ↓ A
p
	
, u :ˆ A,  ′ ⇑ Ctx
opa lvar
, u :ˆ A,  ′ p
	
u ↓ A
p
	
, x : A,  ′ ⇑ Ctx
opa ivar
, x : A,  ′ p
	
x ↓ A
(No rule for )
 p
	
M ↓ A & B
opa fst
 p
	
FST M ↓ A
 p
	
M ↓ A & B
opa snd
 p
	
SND M ↓ B
 ′ p
	
M ↓ A −◦ B  ′′ p
	
N ⇑ A  =  ′   ′′
opa lapp
 p
	
M ˆN ↓ B
 p
	
M ↓ x : A. B  p
	
N ⇑ A
opa iapp
 p
	
M N ↓ [N/x]B
FIG. 2. Precanonical deduction system for λ&, objects.
assumption. Two remaining rules define preatomic derivability for the level of objects. The semantics
of the equivalence rule opa eq is similar to its precanonical counterpart.
The coercion from precanonical to preatomic objects, opa c, is unrestricted in its type. This means
that destructors can be directly applied to constructors; that is, objects may contain redices. If we omit
this rule (or restrict it to base type, which is equivalent), we obtain precisely the canonical forms, that
is, those η-long forms which contain no β-redices.
The rules concerning linear objects in Fig. 2 define the behavior of linear types. If we ignore the objects
and the distinction between precanonical and preatomic judgments, they correspond to the specification
of the familiar rules for the linear connectives , &, and −◦, presented in a natural deduction style. It
is easy to prove the equivalence to the usual sequent formulation. The objects that appear on the left
of these types record the structure of a natural deduction proof for the corresponding linear formulas.
The dependent function type x : A.B that λ& inherits from λ generalizes both intuitionistic
implication A → B (customarily defined as !A −◦B in linear logic) and the universal quantifier ∀x .B,
where A plays the role of the type of the (intuitionistic) variable x . With this interpretation, λ&
encompasses all the connectives and quantifiers of the freely generated fragment of the language of
linear hereditary Harrop formulas, on which the programming language Lolli is based [28]. Additionally,
λ& offers the characteristic features of a type theory: higher-order functions, proof terms, and type
families indexed by arbitrary objects, possibly higher-order and linear.
Admitting other linear connectives in this language is problematic since the remaining operators
of linear logic would introduce in the equational theory a form of reductions known as commuting
conversions, which would destroy the possibility of achieving unique normal forms. On the other hand,
the semantics of the other linear connectives can be easily emulated in λ&, as shown in [42].
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Signatures
sp dot
p · ⇑ Sig
p 	 ⇑ Sig · p
	
A ⇑ TYPE
sp obj
p 	, c : A ⇑ Sig
p 	 ⇑ Sig · p
	
K ⇑ Kind
sp fam
p 	, a : K ⇑ Sig
Contexts
p 	 ⇑ Sig
cp dot
p
	
· ⇑ Ctx
p
	
 ⇑ Ctx  p
	
A ⇑ TYPE
cp int
p
	
, x : A ⇑ Ctx
p
	
 ⇑ Ctx  p
	
A ⇑ TYPE
cp lin
p
	
, u :ˆ A ⇑ Ctx
Kinds
p
	
 ⇑ Ctx
kpc type
 p
	
TYPE ⇑ Kind
, x : A p
	
K ⇑ Kind
kpc dep
 p
	
x : A. K ⇑ Kind
Types/type families
 p
	
P ↓ TYPE
fpc a
 p
	
P ⇑ TYPE
p
	
 ⇑ Ctx
fpc top
 p
	
 ⇑ TYPE
 p
	
A ⇑ TYPE  p
	
B ⇑ TYPE
fpc with
 p
	
A & B ⇑ TYPE
 p
	
A ⇑ TYPE  p
	
B ⇑ TYPE
fpc limp
 p
	
A −◦ B ⇑ TYPE
, x : A p
	
B ⇑ TYPE
fpc dep
 p
	
x : A. B ⇑ TYPE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(No fpc eq, no fpa c)
 p
	
P ↓ K K ≡ K ′  p
	
K ′ ⇑ Kind
fpa eq
 p
	
P ↓ K ′
p
	,a:K ,	′  ⇑ Ctx
fpa con
 p
	,a:K ,	′ a ↓ K
 p
	
P ↓ x : A. K  p
	
N ⇑ A
fpa iapp
 p
	
P N ↓ [N/x]K
FIG. 3. Precanonical deduction system for λ&, kinds and types.
We now turn to the judgments validating types, kinds, contexts, and signatures, treated in Fig. 3. The
rules defining the precanonical judgment ¯ p	 A ⇑ TYPE simply specify that every valid type in the
system should result from the combination of base types (rule fpc a) by means of the type constructors
, −◦, &, and  (rules fpc dep, fpc limp, fpc with, and fpc top, respectively). Notice the differences
in the rules concerning the two function type constructors: the validity of A in x : A.B is implicitly
ascertained when checking the validity of the context in the premise; instead, the type A in A −◦ B is
to be validated explicitly since no assumption is inserted in the context. The rules for the preatomic
type family judgment ¯ p	 A ↓ K simply verify that base types are syntactically well formed and
respect the kind declaration of their leading type family constant (rules fpa iapp and fpa con). Notice
the presence of an equivalence rule: fpa eq. Finally, the rules defining the precanonical kind judgment,
¯ p	 K ⇑ Kind, check that every type appearing in K is valid. Note that this judgment is invoked
only when validating a signature. The remaining rules in Fig. 3 consider signatures and context. They
specify that a signature is valid if the type or kind of every item declared in it is itself valid. Similarly,
a context is valid if the type of each of its assumptions is valid.
In the rules in Figs. 2 and 3, types and kinds are always checked using a purely intuitionistic context.
This has the effect of preventing valid types from containing free linear variables (although bound
linear variables are admitted). Therefore, although the indices of type families are in general linear
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objects, these terms can refer only to context variables that are intuitionistic. We say that indices are
linearly closed. Loosening this restriction would require admitting linear dependent function types in
our language, corresponding to linear quantifiers. Preliminary investigations indicate that this would
lead to tremendous complications in the typing rules of the language, not to speak of its meta-theory.
For example, we could not expect a purely intuitionistic context anymore when looking up a variable,
context splitting would rely on the typing judgments since a blind split might violate linear dependencies,
and linear dependent types have been observed to interact in a complex manner with the other type
constructors, in particular . On the other hand, very few of our examples could have taken advantage
of a linear version of . In every case, using its intuitionistic counterpart in its place did not substantially
alter the resulting representation, nor its adequacy. In conclusion, although a dependent version of −◦
appears beneficial for certain applications, we are led to believe that the consequent complications in
the meta-theory of the language might outweigh the potential advantages.
We classify the rules in Figs. 2 and 3 into essential and nonessential rules. We count among the latter
class the type conversion rules (opc eq, opa eq, and fpa eq) and coercion opa c. All other rules are
considered essential. A major task in this section of the paper will be to either hide or eliminate the
nonessential rules of λ&. Hiding the equivalence rules will permit an easy proof of the decidability
of type-checking for this language. Showing that the rule opa c can be eliminated (in the sense that a
type is inhabited with this rule if and only if it is inhabited without it) amounts to showing that canonical
forms exist for all objects and types. This is a necessary condition for adopting λ& as the underlying
type theory of the logical framework LLF.
We now turn to the reduction semantics of λ&, partially defined in Fig. 4. The notion of defini-
tional equality that we consider is the equivalence relation ≡ constructed on the congruence relation →.
The basis of this congruence consists of the following β-reduction rules:
βfst : FST〈M, N 〉 → M βlapp : (ˆλu : A.M)ˆN → [N/u]M
βsnd : SND〈M, N 〉 → N βiapp : (λx : A.M)N → [N/x]M
As usual, we call the expressions appearing on the left-hand side of the arrow redices. The only possible
redex in λ is βiapp. We adopt the standard terminology and call a term U that does not contain β-redices
normal, or β-normal. This definition extends immediately to contexts and signatures. Another task of
this section will be to show that every valid entity in λ& can be reduced to a normal form and
that this normal form is itself valid in LLF. Finally, a term U is reducible if there is a derivation of the
judgment U → V for some V .
2.3. Equational Theory
We now attack the formal study of λ&. We aim at proving that this type theory has all the
desirable properties that a formalism should possess in order to be a suitable meta-language for a
logical framework. In particular, we will show that λ& is strongly normalizing, admits unique
normal forms, and that typechecking is decidable for this language. These properties rely on a large
number of lemmas and it is a challenge of its own to organize the overall meta-theory in a linear
sequence of results with simple dependencies. This organization relies crucially on the details of the
formulation of the semantics of our type-theory. The adoption of a precanonical system that imposes
extensionality, rather than just permitting it via additional rules, simplifies the development of the
meta-theory of λ& considerably. The principal consequence of this choice is that definitional
equality can be based entirely on β-reduction and, more important, can be defined independently from
typing, as shown in Fig. 4. Therefore, the analysis of the equational theory of λ& can be con-
ducted in a totally self-contained manner. Indeed, the results that we will present in this section, in
particular the Church–Rosser theorem, apply to arbitrary λ& terms and not just to those that are
valid according to the typing rules of our language. This apparently unnecessary generality is the first
step toward disentangling the meta-theory of λ&. Had we relaxed extensionality by consider-
ing an equational theory containing η-conversion rules, as normally done in the literature, we would
have been forced to provide mutually recursive definitions for the typing and the definitional equal-
ity judgments. In particular, the equational theory of the resulting formalism could not be studied in
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Objects Congruences
or con
c −→ c
or var
x −→ x
or unit
〈〉 −→ 〈〉
M −→ M ′
or fst
FST M −→ FST M ′
M −→ M ′
or snd
SND M −→ SND M ′
M −→ M ′ N −→ N ′
or pair
〈M, N 〉 −→ 〈M ′, N ′〉
M −→ M ′ N −→ N ′
or lapp
M ˆN −→ M ′ ˆN ′
A −→ A′ M −→ M ′
or llam
ˆλu : A. M −→ ˆλu : A′. M ′
M −→ M ′ N −→ N ′
or iapp
M N −→ M ′ N ′
A −→ A′ M −→ M ′
or ilam
λx : A. M −→ λx : A′. M ′
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
β−reductions
M −→ M ′
or beta fst
FST 〈M, N 〉 −→ M ′
N −→ N ′
or beta snd
SND 〈M, N 〉 −→ N ′
M −→ M ′ N −→ N ′
or beta lin
( ˆλu : A. M) ˆN −→ [N ′/u]M ′
M −→ M ′ N −→ N ′
or beta int
(λx : A. M) N −→ [N ′/x]M ′
Types/types families Congruences
fr con
a −→ a
P −→ P ′ N −→ N ′
fr iapp
P N −→ P ′ N ′
fr top
 −→ 
A −→ A′ B −→ B ′
fr with
A & B −→ A′ & B ′
A −→ A′ B −→ B ′
fr limp
A −◦ B −→ A′ −◦ B ′
A −→ A′ B −→ B ′
fr dep
x : A. B −→ x : A′. B ′
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(No β-reductions for types and type families)
Kinds Congruences
kr type
TYPE −→ TYPE
A −→ A′ K −→ K ′
kr dep
x : A. K −→ x : A′. K ′
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(No β-reductions for kinds)
FIG. 4. Parallel nested reduction for λ&.
isolation and most of its meta-theory would collapse in one dense theorem consisting of a discour-
aging number of mutually dependent properties. We will come back to this point at the end of this
section.
As we already anticipated, the principal result of this section will be the Church–Rosser theorem
for parallel nested reduction. We will rely on this property in order to prove the uniqueness of normal
forms, and therefore the decidability of the equational theory of LLF.
The proofs of the results in this section adapt the technique originally devised by Tait and Martin-Lo¨f
for the traditional untyped λ-calculus [3]. A very detailed presentation of that method, as well as its
formalization in Elf, can be found in [40]. We deviate from this presentation in order to take into account
all the entities of LLF that participate in the definition of parallel nested reduction. Specifically, we treat
the linear constructs of our language and the new forms of β-reduction they introduce; we also need to
consider types and kinds.
The parallel nested reduction strategy defined in Fig. 4 is based on the four β-reduction rules
or beta fst, or beta snd, or beta lin, and or beta int. All the other rules are congruences that allow
applying reductions to subterms. Notice that the β-reduction rules are directional: the expression on the
left-hand side of the arrow is a β-redex, and we like to think of the expression on the right-hand side
as “simpler,” even if it may be larger, or contain more β-redices, than the term on the other side of the
arrow.
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A key result in the study of the definitional equality of λ& is that substituting a variable in a
reducible term maintains its reducibility. This property is formalized and generalized in the following
lemma, where R :: J is used as an abbreviation for “there is a derivation R of the judgment J.”
LEMMA 2.1 (Substitution). Assume that there exists a derivation for N → N ′. Then,
i. If R :: U → U ′, then [N/x]U → [N ′/x]U ′;
ii. If R :: U →∗ U ′, then [N/x]U →∗ [N ′/x]U ′;
iii. If R :: U ≡ U ′, then [N/x]U ≡ [N ′/x]U ′.
Proof. We proceed by induction on R in each case.
A term can contain several β-redices and the parallel reduction strategy can reduce any of them,
possibly zero or more than one. Therefore, a term U can in general reduce to a number of distinct terms
U1, . . . , Un . However, a fundamental property of this strategy is that there always exist a common term
V to which all these terms are reducible. This is known in the literature as the Diamond property and it
is stated below.
LEMMA 2.2 (Diamond property). If R′ :: U → U ′ and R′′ :: U → U ′′, then there is a term V such
that U ′ → V and U ′′ → V .
Proof. By induction on the structure of U and inversion on R′ and R′′. Functional β-reduction is
handled through the substitution lemma.
Although one run of parallel nested reduction has the possibility of reducing several β-redices, it is
not sufficient in general to produce the normal form for a term, even when it exists. For example, the
following judgment shows on the righthand side the simplest term the expression on the left-hand side
can be reduced to in one step:
(λx : (a → a) → (a → a). xc)(λy : a → a. y) → (λy : a → a. y)c.
Notice that one further step would suffice to obtain the normal form of that expression, which is c.
In order to achieve normal forms when they exist, we need to chain parallel nested reductions by
taking their transitive closure. Confluence extends the diamond property to →∗, while the Church-
Rosser theorem states that it is always possible to reduce equivalent entities back to a common term.
These two properties are stated below. They follow from the diamond property by virtue of general
techniques [16].
THEOREM 2.1 (Church–Rosser).
Confluence: If U →∗ U ′ and U →∗ U ′′, then there is a term V such that U ′ →∗ V
and U ′′ →∗ V .
Church-Rosser: If U ′ ≡ U ′′, then there is a term V such that U ′ →∗ V and U ′′ →∗ V .
The properties above apply to arbitrary terms, possibly ill-typed or in general invalid according to
the precanonical system above (indeed, our example above contained the subterm λy : a → a. y which
is not η-expanded). Although definitional equality is always invoked with valid terms in the rules in
Figs. 2 and 3, intermediate terms participating in the equivalence derivation might not be precanonical.
We will show that it is possible to limit the intermediate terms produced during a definitional equality
test to entities that are valid.
Arbitrary terms do not have in general a normal form. A classical example is the term (λx : a. x x)
(λx : a. x x). This term reduces to itself and therefore it is not possible to eliminate the β-redex it contains
by reduction. However, every valid term, i.e., every term that appears in a derivable typing judgment in
our precanonical system, admits a normal form. Furthermore, the strong normalization theorem proved
below will show that the order in which β-redices are reduced is not important.
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We conclude this section with a short discussion about notions of definitional equality that includes
rules for η-conversion. If we were simply to add η-rules based on the following reductions,
ηpair : 〈FST M, SND M〉 → M
ηllam : ˆλu : A. M ˆu → M
ηilam : λx : A. Mx → M,
with u and x not occurring free in M in the last two rules, then the Church–Rosser property would cease
to hold: it is observed in [27] that the term λx : A. (λy : B. M)x reduces via ηilam to λy : B. M and by
β to λx : A. [x/y]M , i.e., λy : A. M ; however, the two resulting terms can be equated only if A and B
have a common reduct, which is not the case for certain ill-typed terms.
Therefore, the simple η-conversion rules above are insufficient to capture the notion of definitional
equality we are interested in. The situation is actually more serious than that: in the presence of a
unit type,  in our case, the equational theory we need cannot be axiomatized by means of schematic
reduction rules such as the above. Indeed, 〈 〉 is the only inhabitant of type  and therefore every object
of type  is η-equivalent to 〈 〉. However, adding the rule M → 〈 〉 is clearly unsound since it does not
take typing information into account. The correct approach to this problem requires typed definitional
equality judgments. The specific inference rules that handle η-expansion are called extensionality rules
and only vaguely resemble the η-conversions presented above. It seems that (untyped) η-rules can serve
as a foundation of the definitional equality of type theories only in strongly restricted circumstances.
2.4. Fundamental Properties
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the basic properties of the precanonical deduction system
presented earlier. Many of these results are interesting by themselves since they provide insight about
the type theory of LLF beyond what is apparent from the inference rules. Moreover, most of these
properties will play a role in the development of the proof of the decidability of type checking for our
language.
First, we summarize the principal properties regarding the occurrences of free variables. The long
proof of this lemma can be found in [6]. Only a limited number of further results will mention free
variables or domains explicitly. In reading this statement, recall we can tacitly rename bound variables
and that the names of all variables declared in a context are distinct. Moreover, we remind the reader
that  p	 U ⇑↓ V is an abbreviation for the precanonical or preatomic judgments at the level of objects,
types, and kinds.
LEMMA 2.3 (Free variables).
i. If  p	 U ⇑↓ V, then FV(U ) ⊆ dom  and FV(V ) ⊆ dom ¯.
ii. If  p	 U ⇑↓ V or p	  ⇑ Ctx, then FV() ⊆ dom ¯.
iii. If  p	 U ⇑↓ V or p	  ⇑ Ctx or p 	 ⇑ Sig, then FV(	) = .
iv. If , x : :ˆ A,  ′ p	 U ⇑↓ V or p	 , x : :ˆ A,  ′ ⇑ Ctx, then FV(A) ∪ FV() ⊆ dom ¯.
This lemma provides some insight about how and where free variables can appear in a derivable
judgment in λ&. By (i) and (ii), we have that all free variables occurring in a valid judgment must
be declared in its context. Property (iv) specifies that the free variables in an assumption must have been
declared in the part of the context that is to its left; i.e., assumptions can depend only on declarations
made before them. Item (iii) in the lemma states instead that a signature cannot contain free variables.
All these properties already hold in λ. The peculiarities of our language appear when analyzing the
role of free variables that are assumed linearly. Since the context of the judgments for types and kinds
are strictly intuitionstic, (i) entails that free linear variables are permitted only in valid terms from the
level of objects. Moreover, (ii) implies that no assumption in the context can depend on a linear variable.
These strict constraints are a consequence of the property of our language of permitting only linearly
closed expressions as indices to type families.
We now present a number of properties that can be seen as admissible rules of inference. First we
have that assumptions in the context can be exchanged freely as long as they do not violate dependencies
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among them. More precisely, if x : :ˆ A immediately precedes y : :ˆ B and x does not occur free in B, then
the relative order of these two assumptions can be exchanged. This idea is generalized in the lemma
below. Permutation depends on weakening, which itself requires permutation in its proof. Therefore,
we need to state and prove both properties at the same time. Notice that weakening forbids adding linear
assumptions into the context.
LEMMA 2.4 (Structural properties of contexts).
Permutation :
i. If P ′ :: (,  ′, x : :ˆ A,  ′′ p	 U ⇑↓ V ) and P ′′ :: ( ¯ p	 A ⇑ TYPE), then , x : :ˆ A,  ′,
 ′′ p	 U ⇑↓ V .
ii. If P ′ :: (p	 ,  ′, x : :ˆ A,  ′′ ⇑ Ctx) and P ′′ :: ( ¯ p	 A TYPE), then p	 , x : :ˆ A,  ′,
 ′′ ⇑ Ctx.
Weakening:
If P ′ :: ( p	 U ⇑↓ V ) and P ′′ :: (p	 , ¯ ′ ⇑ Ctx), then , ¯ ′ p	 U ⇑↓ V .
Proof. By simultaneous induction on P ′ and, in the case of permutation, on the length of  ′′.
The permutation property has important consequences on the linear assumptions in the context. As
we described earlier, no assumption in a context  can depend on a linear variable. Therefore, the
permutation lemma allows us to shift all these variables to end of . Let us write ˆ for the linear
assumptions of a context . Notice that, because of possible dependencies on intuitionistic variables,
ˆ is not necessarily a valid context. We can then write  as ( ¯, ˆ), or even as “ ¯, ˆ” as in recent
presentations of linear logic that maintain intuitionistic and linear assumptions in different contexts
(separated by “;”) [22, 28, 45]. Furthermore, since the variables in the domain of ˆ cannot occur in ˆ,
we are free to permute the contents of this part of the context. Therefore, ˆ can be treated as a multiset.
We could expect a further property, strengthening, to be part of the statement of the lemma above;
the presence of this property would actually make that proof easier, but unfortunately we do not have
yet the tools to prove it.
Strengthening states that, whenever a variable is declared in a context but does not occur free any-
where in a judgment, then it can safely be dropped and the judgment will still be provable. However,
strengthening requires the strong normalization theorem, proved in Section 2.5. Even though a variable
does not occur in a derivable judgment, it is possible that the application of one of the definitional equiv-
alence rules produces a term containing it, so that not the judgment itself, but its derivation mentions it.
These uses of equivalence are nonessential and can be removed from the derivation. However, we will
be able to prove this only as a by-product of strong normalization.
Next, we present a technical result that, although of minor importance in itself, plays an important
role in the statement of the adequacy theorems for the representation of an object language. Specifically,
when the meta-theory of the object language expects certain objects to behave as if they were linear
hypotheses, an adequate encoding would require free linear variables in the indices of base types. This is
not achievable in LLF since our language does not admit linear dependent types. We bypass the problem
by encoding these linear entities as intuitionistic assumptions. Linearity conditions can be checked at an
earlier stage of the computation, or be kept as intrinsic invariants of the object deductive system. This
technique permits us to give an effective representation to complex linear judgments without dealing
with the complications of linear dependent types. Examples showing how this issue is handled in LLF
can be found in [6].
The lemma below states that whenever a derivable term mentions a linear variable, we can safely
make it intuitionistic. Intuitively, linear variables must be used once while intuitionistic variables can
be used as many times as desired.
LEMMA 2.5 (Promotion). If P ′ :: (, u :ˆ A,  ′ p	 M ⇑↓ B), then , u : A,  ′ p	 M ⇑↓ B.
Proof. By induction on the structure of P .
An important ingredient of the proofs of the theorems below are the lemmas that we call transitivity,
following the terminology in [27]. These results permit interpreting assumptions as place-holders for
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unspecified derivations. Whenever a provable judgment depends on the assumption x ::ˆ A, any derivation
of a term N of type A satisfying certain context conditions can be substituted into the original derivation
and maintain its validity. Therefore, judgments containing assumptions can be thought of as parametric
expressions. The transitivity lemmas specify how to instantiate these parameters.
These results contribute to the suitability of λ& as the meta-language of the logical framework
LLF. They are the formal justification of the representation of the hypothetical and parametric judgments,
so common in formal systems, as simple and dependent function types, respectively. The transitivity
lemmas, together with the inversion lemma below, postulate that these operators have a semantics that
mimics the behavior of those forms of judgment. LLF extends this correspondence, already present in
LF, to capture hypothetical judgments where the hypotheses are linear.
The transitivity lemmas are tightly connected to several results in logic and type theory. The
interpretation depends on which part of the judgments we focus our attention on. From the point
of view of the λ-calculus embedded in our language, these lemmas can be seen as substitution
principles since they describe how variables can be substituted into valid terms while preserving
validity. In this, they are closely related to the notion of subject reduction for functional objects.
From the logical perspective, under the interpretation of types as formulas, the transitivity lemmas
state the admissibility of the cut rule for intuitionistic and linear formulas. Whenever a formula B
relies on an assumption A, any evidence of the validity of A, possibly on the basis of further as-
sumptions, can be included directly in an equivalent proof of B that does not mention A among its
hypotheses.
Linear and intuitionistic assumptions need to be treated separately since they require a different
structuring of the context. Therefore, we distinguish two transitivity lemmas. This corresponds to
differentiating two substitution principles or to having a linear and an intuitionistic cut rule (see [29,
42]).
LEMMA 2.6 (Intuitionistic transitivity).
i. If ¯ p	 N⇑A and P:: (, x : A,  ′ p	 U⇑↓ V ), then, [N/x] ′ p	 [N/x]U ⇑↓ [N/x]V .
ii. If ¯ p	 N ⇑ A and P :: (p	 , x : A,  ′ ⇑ Ctx), then p	 , [N/x] ′ ⇑ Ctx.
Proof. By induction on the structure of P .
We now state the linear transitivity lemma. Notice that, in contrast to the intuitionistic case, the
context in the resulting judgment can be larger than the contexts mentioned in either premise.
LEMMA 2.7 (Linear transitivity). If  p	 N ⇑ A and P :: ( ¯, u :ˆ A,  ′ p	 M ⇑↓ B), then ,  ′ p	
[N/u]M ⇑↓ B.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of P . Weakening is required in this proof.
The cumulative validity lemma below states that whenever a judgment is derivable, all entities
mentioned in it are themselves valid, i.e., have derivations validating them.
LEMMA 2.8 (Consistency).
i. If P ::  p	 M ⇑↓ A, then ¯ p	 A ⇑ TYPE.
ii. If P :: ¯ p	 A ⇑↓ K , then ¯ p	 K ⇑ Kind.
iii. If P ::  p	 U ⇑↓ V, then p	  ⇑ Ctx.
iv. If P ::  p	 U ⇑↓ V or P :: p	  ⇑ Ctx, then p 	 ⇑ Sig.
Proof. By induction on the structure of P . We need intuitionistic transitivity in order to handle the
dependent function type constructor.
The traditional Curry–Howard interpretation associates types with formulas and terms with proofs
of these formulas. Clearly, a single formula can have more than one proof, expressed in type theory
by admitting several objects of the same type, possibly infinitely many. This is also consistent with the
view of types as sets and terms as their elements. In the logical interpretation, we expect every proof to
be the proof of a single formula. This property might not be desirable in all type theories, but it holds
in the case of languages such as LF and LLF so that objects have meaning independent of the type
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ascribed to them. Uniqueness, in these frameworks, is considered modulo definitional equality. Indeed,
every valid λ& object-level term has a unique type. This property, which extends naturally to kinds,
is essential in our proof of the decidability of type checking. It is formally stated in the following
lemma.
LEMMA 2.9 (Uniqueness of types and kinds).
i. If P ′ ::  ′ p	 M ⇑↓ A′ and P ′′ ::  ′′ p	 M ⇑↓ A′′ with  ′|FV(M) =  ′′|FV(M) and where the
arrows do not need to match, then A′ ≡ A′′.
ii. If P ′ :: ¯ p	 A ⇑↓ K ′ and P ′′ :: ¯ p	 A ⇑↓ K ′′ where the arrows do not need to match,
then K ′ ≡ K ′′.
Proof. By induction on the structure of P ′ and P ′′. The idea is to examine these derivations from
the bottom up until an introduction or an elimination rule is exposed; then we apply the induction
hypothesis on the subderivations.
Given a particular instance of a judgment, the proof technique known as inversion allows identifying
a limited number of inference rules whose conclusion matches this judgment. Each matching rule
constitutes an alternative case and the judgments obtained by instantiation of its premises can be used in
order to draw further inferences. In order to prove that the original judgment is derivable, it is sufficient
to exhibit derivations for the premises of all the matching rules. This technique is general and can
be applied in our system. Deductive systems having the characteristic that every rule of inference is
fully determined by the shape of a particular term in its conclusion are called syntax-directed. They are
particularly useful since matching this term yields a single rule. Therefore, further inferences can be
drawn on the basis of its premises, without having to consider alternatives. The essential rules in the
precanonical deductive system for λ& are syntax-directed with respect to the term they validate.
However, the equivalences and the rules that bridge the preatomic and precanonical judgments do not
change the derived term and can therefore be seen as filters or pipelines that connect these essential
rules, from the standpoint of this term. A detailed analysis of these rules shows that we can indirectly
recover the stronger form of inversion. This desirable property is expressed by the following lemma.
LEMMA 2.10 (Inversion).
i. If P :: ( p	 〈M, N 〉 ⇑↓ A&B), then  p	 M ⇑↓ A and  p	 N ⇑↓ B.
ii. If P :: ( p	 ˆλu : A.M ⇑↓ A′  B), then , u :ˆ A p	 M ⇑↓ B and A ≡ A′.
iii. If P :: ( p	 λx : A.M ⇑↓ x : A′.B), then , x : A p	 M ⇑↓ B and A ≡ A′.
Proof. By induction on the structure ofP . All these results apply the same technique: the derivation
is unfolded until an introduction or an elimination appears as its last inference rule.
The last property we present in this section is extensionality. It confirms that all terms that are valid
according to the precanonical judgment of the object level are indeed precanonical, i.e., in η-long form.
It forbids, for example, a constant c of compound type A to be derivable by means of a judgment of the
form  p	 c ⇑ A, whatever the signature 	 and the context  are.
LEMMA 2.11 (Extensionality).
i. If P ::  p	 M ⇑ , then M = 〈 〉.
ii. If P ::  p	 M ⇑ A&B, then M = 〈M1, M2〉.
iii. If P ::  p	 M ⇑ A  B, then M = ˆλu : A′. M1, with A ≡ A′.
iv. If P ::  p	 M ⇑ x : A. B, then M = λx : A′. M1, with A ≡ A′.
Proof. By induction on the structure of P .
2.5. Strong Normalization
The aim of this section is to prove strong normalization for λ&. This property implies that every
valid λ& term U has a normal form NF(U ), that this normal form is unique, and that it can be
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obtained by performing β-reductions in arbitrary order in U . We adapt the technique originally proposed
for LF in [27]. We only sketch it here. The interested reader is referred to [6] for details.
The proof proceeds via a translation of λ& into the simply typed λ-calculus with pairs λ×→. The
effect of this encoding will be to eliminate dependencies and linearity, considerably simplifying the
treatment of the calculus. This translation has two fundamental properties: first it maintains well-
typedness, so that valid terms in λ& are mapped to terms that are valid in λ×→. Second, it preserves
reductions so that every reduction sequence in λ& corresponds to a reduction sequence in λ×→.
The strong normalization theorem for λ& is then a consequence of the same property of λ×→.
The first step toward proving the strong normalization theorem is given by the following lemma. It
states that derivability is closed under reduction; i.e., if a term U is valid in λ&, then every term U ′
that differs from U only by the application of a β-reduction step is also valid. This property is known
as subject reduction. We write U →+ V if U →∗ V and U = V . Notice that the symmetric property
considering β-expansion does not hold in general.
LEMMA 2.12 (Subject reduction). If P ::  p	 U ⇑↓ V and R :: U →+ U ′, then  p	 U ′ ⇑↓ V .
Proof. By induction on the structure of P and inversion on R.
We do not present in detail the simply typed λ-calculus with pairs, λ×→ [51]. We overload some of
the operators of λ& to indicate analogous symbols of λ×→. For our purposes, we will need a single
base type that we denote as ω. We base the equational theory of λ×→ on the one-step reduction relation
→1, which is more appropriate for our purposes than parallel nested reduction. We write →+1 for its
transitive closure. We will rely on some basic properties for these judgments. We do not state or prove
them formally since they resemble similar properties of LLF and are well known from the literature. A
further property that λ×→ enjoys is strong normalization: if  	 M : σ , then every reduction sequence
on M terminates and, by confluence, yields a unique normal form for this term. Proofs of this and
stronger properties for extensions of this language can be found in the literature [19, 51].
The encoding we propose transforms LLF judgments  p	 U ⇑↓ V into λ×→ judgments of the
form  	, M : σ . It maps the generic term U to an object M in λ×→, V to a simple type σ , 	 to a
signature 	′, and  to a context . We now present the four parts that constitute this translation.
We use the function τ ( ) to denote the translation of a term that appears on the right-hand side of
the arrow of an LLF judgment. These terms can be either types, kinds, or the symbol Kind, which we
map to ω. Given a type or kind U , τ (U ) is a simple type of λ×→ that maintains the structure of U , but
forgets dependencies and linearity. Type families are mapped to the base type ω, the additive product
type constructor & of LLF is encoded into the (intuitionistic) product types × of λ×→, and both function
type constructors and  of our language are represented by the unique arrow of that calculus. Kinds
are treated similarly. Specifically, we have the following definition for τ ( ):
Types Kinds
τ (P) = ω τ (TYPE) = ω
τ () = ω τ (x : A.K ) = τ (A) → τ (K )
τ (A&B) = τ (A) × τ (B)
τ (A  B) = τ (A) → τ (B)
τ (x : A.B) = τ (A) → τ (B)
As an example, the λ& type
A = a  ((x : a  a. a) & (a  y : a. a))
has the following encoding in λ×→:
τ (A) = ω → (((ω → ω) → ω) × (ω → ω → ω)).
A term U appearing immediately to the left of the arrow of an LLF judgment  p	 U ⇑↓ V is
mapped to a λ×→ object by means of the function | |. U can be an object, a type, a type family, or a kind.
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The encoding of objects maps variables to variables, constants to constants, and constructors and
destructors of λ& to the corresponding operator of λ×→. The two forms of λ-abstraction of LLF
must be mapped to λ×→ in a way which preserves the redices in the type label. We cope with this
issue by encoding ˆλx : A.M , for example, as (λy : ω.λx : τ (A).|M |)|A|. The expected translation of the
former term is λx : τ (A).|M |. We embed it in the β-redex (λy : ω. )|A| in order to account for possible
reductions performed in the λ& type A. This redex is vacuous since y is a fresh variable not
appearing in A or M .
The encoding of types and kinds translates each λ& operator as a constant in λ×→, which
is applied to the encoding of the arguments. The dependent type and kind constructor  requires a
functional second argument since its semantics introduces assumptions in the context.
We have the following definition for this encoding function, where π , possibly subscripted, denotes
constants in λ×→:
Objects Types and kinds
|x | = x |a| = πa
|c| = πc |P N | = |P| |N |
|〈 〉| = π〈〉 || = π
|〈M, N 〉| = 〈|M |, |N |〉 |A&B| = π& |A| |B|
|FST M | = FST |M | |A  B| = π |A| |B|
|SND M | = SND |M | |x : A.B| = πτ (A) |A|(λx : τ (A).|B|)
|ˆλu : A.M | = (λy : ω.λu : τ (A).|M |)|A|
|MˆN | = |M | |N | |TYPE| = πTYPE
|λx : A.M | = (λy : ω.λx : τ (A).|M |)|A| |x : A.K | = πτ (A)|A|(λx : τ (A).|K |)
|M N | = |M | |N |
with y not appearing in either A or M . For example, the translation of the functional identity
M = λx : (z : a.a).x
is
|M | = (λy : ω.λx : ω → ω.x)(πωπa(λz : ω.πa)).
The encoding of contexts inductively extends τ ( ), eliminating the distinction between intuitionistic
and linear assumptions. The encoding τ (	) of an LLF signature 	 consists of two parts: a variable part
defining the type of every declaration v : U in 	 as πv : τ (U ) and a fixed part declaring the type of the
constants needed to represent the type and kind operators of our language. The treatment of  yields
an infinite family of declarations, one for each simple type in λ×→. We have the following definitions:
Context Signature
τ (·) = · τ (	) = πc : τ (A), for c : A in 	
τ (, u :ˆ A) = τ (), u : τ (A) πa : τ (K ), for a : K in 	
τ (, x : A) = τ (), x : τ (A) πσ : ω → (σ → ω) → ω,
π〈〉 : ω,
π : ω,
π& : ω → ω → ω,
π : ω → ω → ω,
πTYPE : ω
The encoding just presented preserves well-typedness: Whenever a term U is valid in λ&, the
object |U | is valid in λ×→. This property is formally stated in the following lemma.
LEMMA 2.13 (Adequacy of the translation).
i. If P ::  p	 M ⇑↓ A, then τ () τ (	) |M | : τ (A).
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ii. If P :: ¯ p	 A ⇑↓ K , then τ ( ¯) τ (	) |A| : τ (K ).
iii. If P :: ¯ p	 K ⇑ Kind, then τ ( ¯) τ (	) |K | : ω.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of P .
The proposed encoding has the further property of preserving reductions. Therefore, whenever, a
term U reduces to U ′ in λ&, the term |U | reduces to |U ′| in λ×→ in at least as many steps. The
extra β-redex in the representation of λ-abstraction causes individual reductions in our language to be
mapped to multistep reductions in the target language, in general.
LEMMA 2.14 (Preservation of reduction sequences). If R :: U →+ V, then |U | →+1 |V |.
Proof. By induction on the structure of R.
We now have all the ingredients to prove the strong normalization theorem for λ&. A term U is
normalizing if there exist a term U ′ in normal form such that U →∗ U ′. U is strongly normalizing if
every reduction sequence yields a normal term.
The strong normalization theorem states that every derivable term is strongly normalizing. This
property holds in λ×→, as proved for example in [19, 51], and we use this fact to prove that it is valid
also for λ&.
THEOREM 2.2 (Strong normalization). If  p	 U ⇑↓ V, then U is strongly normalizing.
Proof. By the adequacy of the translation (Lemma 2.13), we have that τ () τ (	) |U | : τ (V ) is
derivable in λ×→.
Assume we have a (possibly infinite) reduction sequence in λ& starting from U :
U = U0 →+ U1 →+ · · · .
By reduction preservation (Lemma 2.14) there is a corresponding reduction sequence
|U0| →+1 |U1| →+1 · · ·
in λ×→. Since the latter must be finite, the former will also be finite.
The validity of strong normalization permits the derivation of a number of further properties for our
language. A first result is that the normal form of a derivable term is unique, stated below.
COROLLARY 2.1 (Uniqueness of normal forms). If  p	 U ⇑↓ V, U →∗ U ′, and U →∗ U ′′ with
both U ′ and U ′′ in normal form, then U ′ = U ′′.
Proof. By confluence, there exists a term V such that U ′ →∗ V and U ′′ →∗ V . However, since U ′
and U ′′ are normal, they do not contain β-redices, and therefore U ′ = V = U ′′.
This property allows us to define a function NF( ) in order to denote the normal form of a valid term
U . NF(U ) is computed from U by applying β-reductions in this term until a normal form is eventually
reached. Strong normalization guarantees that this normal form arises after a finite number of steps,
and the lemma above ensures that the resulting term is unique.
A further consequence of the strong normalization theorem is that the equational theory of LLF is
decidable; i.e., it can be effectively decided whether there exists a derivation for the judgment U ≡ U ′,
for U and U ′ valid terms. The idea is to check that NF(U ) and NF(U ′) are identical.
COROLLARY 2.2 (Decidability of the equational theory). If  p	 U ′ ⇑↓ V and  p	 U ′′ ⇑↓ V,
then it can be recursively decided whether U ′ ≡ U ′′ is derivable.
Proof. By the Church–Rosser property, U ′ and U ′′ have a common reduct U . By subject reduction,
U is valid. Therefore, by uniqueness (Corollary 2.1), U ′, U , and U ′′ share the same normal form NF(U ).
By the strong normalization theorem, every sequence of reduction on U ′ and U ′′ eventually produces
NF(U ) after a finite number of steps. Therefore, a possible decision procedure for definitional equality
is as follows: compute the normal forms of U ′ and U ′′ and then check whether they are syntactically
equal. If they are, then U ′ is definitionally equal to U ′′. Otherwise, they are not equivalent.
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Yet another consequence of the strong normalization theorem is that every derivable λ& judgment
can be constrained to mention only objects in normal form. Although not strictly needed, it is a common
practice to write LLF signatures in normal form.
COROLLARY 2.3 (Normal forms).
i. If P ::  p	 U ⇑↓ V, then NF() pNF(	) NF(U ) ⇑↓ NF(V ).
ii. If P :: p	 ψ ⇑ Ctx, then pNF (	) NF() ⇑ Ctx.
iii. If P :: p 	 ⇑ Sig, then p NF(	) ⇑ Sig.
Proof. We first reduce U to normal form in (i) by means of the previous corollary and then proceed
by induction on the structure of P .
In an implementation of the language, converting terms to normal form as soon as β-redices appear
as the result of substitutions is not always necessary. It is usually more efficient to work with weak head-
normal forms, which differ from normal forms by permitting redices in the argument of applications.
A final consequence of the strong normalization theorem is that rule opa c can be dropped as soon
as we are only interested in valid normal terms. As we briefly motivated earlier, only the presence of
this rule permits the formation of β-redices in valid terms (i.e., in the terms immediately to the left of
the arrow in a precanonical or preatomic judgment). Eliminating this rule is beneficial in order to use
λ& as the language of the logical framework LLF since it prevents nonnormal terms from being
validated without losing any valid normal term.
2.6. Algorithmic System
A proof of the decidability of type checking for LLF is difficult to achieve directly in the precanonical
system in Figs. 2 and 3. Indeed, it is not possible to predict the size of a derivation for a judgment
since the rules that we called nonessential in Section 2.1 (the equivalence rules and opa c) can be
chained arbitrarily. The strong normalization theorem and the admissibility of opa c limit the need for
these rules drastically. In this section, we will embed the first of these results in a deductive system for
λ& having the characteristic that every derivable judgment has a derivation whose size is bounded
by a function of the terms constituting this judgment; we will come back to this aspect in Section 2.7.
Following the terminology of [27], we call this system algorithmic. The properties of this system will
also permit us to eventually prove the validity of strengthening for our language.
The algorithmic system for λ& consists of judgments similar to the precanonical presentation;
indeed, we use the same expressions, only annotating the turnstile symbol with the letter a instead
of p. The notion of definitional equality is the same, but we do not access the judgments defining
the equational theory directly. We rely instead on the normalization function NF( ), which is known
to exist from the previous section. We remind the reader that this function is defined only for valid
terms, and it will be easy to check that whenever it is used in the algorithmic system, its argument is
valid.
The inference rules defining the behavior of the algorithmic system are displayed in Figs. 5 and 6. This
deductive system shares with the precanonical system of Section 2.2 the property that every derivable
term is in η-long form. This aspect will be a consequence of the soundness theorem below. However, the
algorithmic system has the further characteristic that all terms mentioned in any well-formed derivation
are themselves valid. As we said, ill-formed terms could appear in equivalence subderivations by using
β-expansions. In the algorithmic system, the equivalence relation ≡ has been eliminated in favor of
applications of the normalization function in the rules introducing the dependent type or kind constructor
 (faa iapp and oaa iapp), which involve the application of a substitution. The algorithmic system
has also the property that the terms appearing on the right of the arrow are always in canonical form.
We achieve this effect by normalizing types and kinds when fetching them from the signature or the
context (rules faa con, oaa con, oaa lvar, oaa ivar, oca llam, and oca ilam).
The correspondence between the algorithmic and the precanonical systems is formalized by means of
the following soundness and completeness theorems. First, every valid term in the algorithmic system
is also valid in the precanonical formulation.
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Signatures
sa dot
a · ⇑ Sig
a 	 ⇑ Sig · a
	
A ⇑ TYPE
sa obj
a 	, c : A ⇑ Sig
a 	 ⇑ Sig · a
	
K ⇑ Kind
sa fam
a 	, a : K ⇑ Sig
Contexts
a 	 ⇑ Sig
ca dot
a
	
· ⇑ Ctx
a
	
 ⇑ Ctx  a
	
A ⇑ TYPE
ca int
a
	
, x : A ⇑ Ctx
a
	
 ⇑ Ctx  a
	
A ⇑ TYPE
ca lin
a
	
, u :ˆ A ⇑ Ctx
Kinds
a
	
 ⇑ Ctx
kca type
 a
	
TYPE ⇑ Kind
, x : A a
	
K ⇑ Kind
kca dep
 a
	
x : A. K ⇑ Kind
Types/type families
 a
	
P ↓ TYPE
fca a
 a
	
P ⇑ TYPE
a
	
 ⇑ Ctx
fca top
 a
	
 ⇑ TYPE
 a
	
A ⇑ TYPE  a
	
B ⇑ TYPE
fca with
 a
	
A & B ⇑ TYPE
 a
	
A ⇑ TYPE  a
	
B ⇑ TYPE
fca limp
 a
	
A −◦ B ⇑ TYPE
, x : A a
	
B ⇑ TYPE
fca dep
 a
	
x : A. B ⇑ TYPE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a
	,a:K ,	′  ⇑ Ctx
faa con
 a
	,a:K ,	′ a ↓ NF(K )
 a
	
P ↓ x : A. K  a
	
N ⇑ A
faa iapp
 a
	
P N ↓ NF([N/x]K )
FIG. 5. Algorithmic deduction system for λ&, kinds and types.
THEOREM 2.3 (Soundness of the algorithmic system).
i. If A ::  a	 U ⇑↓ V, then  p	 U ⇑↓ V and V is in normal form.
ii. If A :: a	  ⇑ Ctx, then p	  ⇑ Ctx.
iii. If A :: a 	 ⇑ Sig, then p 	 ⇑ Sig.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of A.
The completeness theorem states that every judgment having a derivation in the precanonical system
is also derivable in the system presented in this section. Therefore, no valid term is lost by moving to
the algorithmic system. Notice, however, that the type or kind appearing on the right-hand side of the
main judgments of the precanonical system must be normalized in the algorithmic system.
THEOREM 2.4 (Completeness of the algorithmic system).
i. If P ::  p	 U ⇑↓ V, then  a	 U ⇑↓ NF(V ).
ii. If P :: p	  ⇑ Ctx, then a	  ⇑ Ctx.
iii. If P :: p 	 ⇑ Sig, then a 	 ⇑ Sig.
Proof. By induction on the structure of P .
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Objects
 a
	
M ↓ P
oca a
 a
	
M ⇑ P
a
	
 ⇑ Ctx
oca unit
 a
	
〈〉 ⇑ 
 a
	
M ⇑ A  a
	
N ⇑ B
oca pair
 a
	
〈M, N 〉 ⇑ A & B
, u :ˆ A a
	
M ⇑ B
oca llam
 a
	
ˆλu : A. M ⇑ NF(A) −◦ B
, x : A a
	
M ⇑ B
oca ilam
 a
	
λx : A. M ⇑ x :NF(A). B
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 a
	
M ⇑ A
oaa c
 a
	
M ↓ A
a
	,c:A,	′  ⇑ Ctx
oaa con
 a
	,c:A,	′ c ↓ NF(A)
a
	
, u :ˆ A,  ′ ⇑ Ctx
oaa lvar
, u :ˆ A,  ′ a
	
u ↓ NF(A)
a
	
, x : A,  ′ ⇑ Ctx
oaa ivar
, x : A,  ′ a
	
x ↓ NF(A)
(No rule for )
 a
	
M ↓ A & B
oaa fst
 a
	
FST M ↓ A
 a
	
M ↓ A & B
oaa snd
 a
	
SND M ↓ B
 ′ a
	
M ↓ A −◦ B  ′′ a
	
N ⇑ A  =  ′   ′′
oaa lapp
 a
	
M ˆN ↓ B
 a
	
M ↓ x : A. B  a
	
N ⇑ A
oaa iapp
 a
	
M N ↓ NF([N/x]B)
FIG. 6. Algorithmic deduction system for λ&, objects.
The proofs of these results are constructive and therefore specify an effective transformation proce-
dure.
The strict access to definitional equality, and in particular the impossibility of using it for β-
expansions, permits a direct proof of the strengthening lemma in the algorithmic system.
LEMMA 2.15 (Strengthening).
i. If , s ::ˆ A,  ′ p	 U ⇑↓ V, and x /∈ FV( ′) ∪ FV(U ) ∪ FV(V ), then ,  ′ p	 U ⇑↓ V .
ii. If p	 , x ::ˆ A,  ′ ⇑ Ctx, and x /∈ FV( ′), then p	 ,  ′ ⇑ Ctx.
Proof. We first prove the analogous lemma for the algorithmic system by induction on a derivation
of the given derivations and then use the above soundness and completeness results to transfer it to the
precanonical setting.
2.7. Decidability
The absence of explicit equivalences in the algorithmic system limits the choices of the inference
rules that can be used at every step of a derivation considerably. Every well-formed judgment matches
the conclusion of at most one rule, with the only exception of judgments of the form  	 M ↓ A, for
which the coercion oaa c from canonical terms is always available. Moreover, the terms appearing in
the central part of a validity judgment become smaller when going from the conclusion to the premises
in all rules in Figs. 5 and 6 except fca a, oca a, and oaa c, for which they remain the same. Notice that
possible cycles generated by the last two can be easily detected and removed. In practice, we restrict
the oaa c coercion to types A which are not base types P , thereby also avoiding cycles while retaining
completeness.
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Objects:
‖x‖ = 1
‖c‖ = 1
‖〈〉‖ = 1
‖〈M, N 〉‖ = 1 + ‖M‖ + ‖N‖
‖FST M‖ = 1 + ‖M‖
‖SND M‖ = 1 + ‖M‖
‖ ˆλu : A. M‖ = 2 + ‖A‖ + ‖M‖
‖M ˆN‖ = 1 + ‖M‖ + ‖N‖
‖λx : A. M‖ = 2 + ‖A‖ + ‖M‖
‖M N‖ = 1 + ‖M‖ + ‖N‖
Types:
‖a‖ = 1
‖P N‖ = 1 + ‖P‖ + ‖N‖
‖‖ = 1
‖A & B‖ = 1 + ‖A‖ + ‖B‖
‖A −◦ B‖ = 1 + ‖A‖ + ‖B‖
‖x : A. B‖ = 2 + ‖A‖ + ‖B‖
Kinds:
‖TYPE‖ = 1
‖x : A. K‖ = 2 + ‖A‖ + ‖K‖
Contexts:
‖ · ‖ = 1
‖, u :ˆ A‖ = 1 + ‖‖ + ‖A‖
‖, x : A‖ = 1 + ‖‖ + ‖A‖
Signatures:
‖ · ‖ = 1
‖	, c : A‖ = 1 + ‖	‖ + ‖A‖
‖	, a : K‖ = 1 + ‖	‖ + ‖K‖
Judgments:
‖ a 	 ⇑ Sig‖ = ‖	‖
‖ a
	
 ⇑ Ctx‖ = ‖	‖ + ‖‖
‖ a
	
K ⇑ Kind‖ = ‖	‖ + ‖‖ + ‖K‖
‖ a
	
A ⇑ TYPE‖ = ‖	‖ + ‖‖ + ‖A‖
‖ a
	
A ↓ K‖ = ‖	‖ + ‖‖ + ‖A‖
‖ a
	
M ⇑ A‖ = ‖	‖ + ‖‖ + ‖M‖
‖ a
	
M ↓ A‖ = ‖	‖ + ‖‖ + ‖M‖
‖ =  ′   ′′‖ = ‖‖
FIG. 7. Size computation for the algorithmic system.
In this section, we take advantage of these characteristics in order to prove the decidability in LLF
of verifying whether a fully specified λ& judgment is derivable or not—type checking—and of
computing a type or a kind for a judgment whose rightmost term is left unspecified, or declaring that
no such term exists—type synthesis. Both issues need to be faced simultaneously in our language.
In order to achieve this goal, a preliminary step consists of defining a complexity measure for an
algorithmic judgment. This number yields an upper bound for the size of at least one of its derivations.
For this purpose, we rely on a family of size functions that we denote uniformly as ‖ ‖. We designed
these functions so that the size of the conclusion of every essential rule in the algorithmic system is
strictly larger than the size of each of its premises.
The size of terms, types, and kinds is defined in the upper part of Fig. 7. The numerical constants in
this definition ensure that a term has larger size than its subterms. Notice that the size expressions of
constructs that bind variables rely on the constant 2 rather than 1. This measure ensures that the size
of the conclusion of their introduction rule is larger than the size of the premise, which mentions an
extended context.
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This definition to contexts and signatures is in the central part of Fig. 7. We then combine the size
of terms, contexts, and signatures in order to define the size of all the judgments participating in the
algorithmic system in the lower part of Fig. 7. Notice that the size of a judgment does not refer to the
term appearing to the right of the arrow. This is necessary for our purposes since the size of this term
in the premises of the elimination rules can in general be larger than in the conclusion.
We designed the functions above so that the size of a judgment is an upper bound on the height of
at least one of its derivations in the algorithmic system (which does not directly access the definitional
equality judgments). This property is expressed by the following lemma. It is proved in two steps: first
we eliminate all sequences of rules consisting only of the alternation of oca a and oaa c; second, we
show that the size of the premises of an introduction or elimination rule is always smaller than the size
of the conclusion.
LEMMA 2.16 (Upper bound on the size of a derivation).
i. Let h = ‖ a	 U ⇑↓ V ‖. If A ::  a	 U ⇑↓ V, then A′ ::  a	 U ⇑↓ V .
ii. Let h = ‖ a	  ⇑ Ctx‖. If A :: a	  ⇑ Ctx, then A′ :: a	  ⇑ Ctx.
iii. Let h = ‖ a 	 ⇑ Sig‖. If A :: a 	 ⇑ Sig, then A′ :: a 	 ⇑ Sig.
In each case A′ has height less than 2h and contains at most 32h nodes.
We now have all the necessary ingredients to prove that the type checking problem is decidable
in LLF. Given a judgment whose validity we want to decide, a first naive idea is to match it against
the conclusion of the inference rules defining the algorithmic system. If none of these rules apply, then
the judgment is not derivable; otherwise, we check recursively that the instantiated premises of the
viable rules are derivable. The lemma above provides an upper bound on the number of rules that need
to be considered.
Unfortunately, such a bound is not enough since the types in the premises of the elimination rules
are larger than in the conclusion and would have to be guessed in a pure bottom-up strategy. However,
they are determined by the signature and context using type synthesis [4]. Proving decidability of type
synthesis requires type checking in order to validate contexts, so we need to prove these two properties
simultaneously.
THEOREM 2.5 (Decidability of type checking).
i. (Type checking) It can be recursively decided whether  p	 U ⇑↓ V, p	  ⇑ Ctx, and
p 	 ⇑ Sig are derivable.
ii. (Type synthesis) Given a signature 	, a context , and a term U, there is a recursive procedure
that computes a term V such that the judgment  p	 U ⇑↓ V is derivable or determines that no such
V exists.
Proof. We prove the analogous property for the algorithmic system and rely on the constructive
aspects of the soundness and completeness theorems above to transfer it to the precanonical setting.
The idea, in order to prove the algorithmic formulation of this result, is to apply inference rules that
match U (and V for type checking) until either a derivation is produced, no rule is applicable, or the
upper bound on the size of the derivation at hand has been reached.
The mutually recursive parts of this theorem yield effective procedures for type checking and type
synthesis. Once this result has been proved, type checking can be conveniently reduced to type synthesis:
In order to check whether  p	 M ⇑↓ A is derivable, it suffices to check that A is valid, infer a type
A′ such that  p	 M ⇑↓ A′ is derivable, and check whether A ≡ A′ holds, which, by Corollary 2.2, is
decidable. An application of the equivalence rules yields  p	 M ⇑↓ A. The subproblem of checking
whether A is valid is also reduced to finding a kind for it, without indirections this time.
The decidability of type checking is a necessary property for using a formalism as a meta-
representation language. Like LF, LLF encodes judgments from an object language as types and their
derivations as object level terms. The decidability of type checking for λ& permits determining
effectively whether a given object is the representation of a valid derivation from a (potentially linear)
object formalism.
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2.8. Canonical Forms
As in the precanonical case, the algorithmic system presented in Section 2.6 prevents terms which
are not in η-long form from being validated. The only exception concerns the process of constructing
a term U by means of the judgments  a	 U ↓ V , where U will not necessarily be η-expanded, in
general. In this section, we will present a proof system that forces all entities appearing in a derivable
judgment to be also in normal form. Therefore, all valid terms will be canonical, i.e., in η-long form
and without β-redices. We will achieve this property by removing rule oaa c, which, as we saw, permits
the formation of β-redices in derivable terms. In this system, we will also customize the rules of the
algorithmic system to make them more suited for automation. We will rely on this deductive system in
the remainder of the paper.
When deriving a judgment of the form  	 U ⇑↓ V , the canonical system in Figs. 8 and 9
presupposes the validity of both the signature 	 and the context . Consequently, the rules dealing
with constants, variables, and other atomic terms do not need their premise anymore; they are the leaves
of the derivations. When applying the rules for λ-abstraction or when checking that a dependent type is
valid (rules fc dep and kc dep), we need to check that the type of the assumption added to the context
is valid. This ensures the validity of the context in the premise of the rules. In rule oa lapp, which relies
on context splitting, the contexts occurring in the premises differ from the context in the conclusion only
by the removal of some linear assumptions. These contexts are, however, valid since in our language,
linear variables cannot occur free in types, and therefore no assumption can depend on them (see
Lemma 2.3).
Signatures
sc dot
 · ⇑ Sig
 	 ⇑ Sig · 
	
A ⇑ TYPE
sc obj
 	, c : A ⇑ Sig
 	 ⇑ Sig · 
	
K ⇑ Kind
sc fam
 	, a : K ⇑ Sig
Contexts
cc dot

	
· ⇑ Ctx

	
 ⇑ Ctx  
	
A ⇑ TYPE
cc int

	
, x : A ⇑ Ctx

	
 ⇑ Ctx  
	
A ⇑ TYPE
cc lin

	
, u :ˆ A ⇑ Ctx
Kinds
kc type
 
	
TYPE ⇑ Kind
 
	
A ⇑ TYPE , x : A 
	
K ⇑ Kind
kc dep
 
	
x : A. K ⇑ Kind
Types/type families
 
	
P ↓ TYPE
fc a
 
	
P ⇑ TYPE
fc top
 
	
 ⇑ TYPE
 
	
A ⇑ TYPE  
	
B ⇑ TYPE
fc with
 
	
A & B ⇑ TYPE
 
	
A ⇑ TYPE  
	
B ⇑ TYPE
fc limp
 
	
A −◦ B ⇑ TYPE
 
	
A ⇑ TYPE , x : A 
	
B ⇑ TYPE
fc dep
 
	
x : A. B ⇑ TYPE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
fa con
 
	,a:K ,	′ a ↓ K
 
	
P ↓ x : A. K  
	
N ⇑ A
fa iapp
 
	
P N ↓ NF([N/x]K )
FIG. 8. Canonical deduction system for λ&, kinds and types.
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Objects
 
	
M ↓ P
oc a
 
	
M ⇑ P
oc unit
 
	
〈〉 ⇑ 
 
	
M ⇑ A  
	
N ⇑ B
oc pair
 
	
〈M, N 〉 ⇑ A & B
 
	
A ⇑ TYPE , u :ˆ A 
	
M ⇑ B
oc llam
 
	
ˆλu : A. M ⇑ A −◦ B
 
	
A ⇑ TYPE , x : A 
	
M ⇑ B
oc ilam
 
	
λx : A. M ⇑ x : A. B
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
oa con
 
	,c:A,	′ c ↓ A
oa lvar
, u :ˆ A,  ′ 
	
u ↓ A
oa ivar
, x : A,  ′ 
	
x ↓ A
(No rule for )  	 M ↓ A & B oa fst
 
	
FST M ↓ A
 
	
M ↓ A & B
oa snd
 
	
SND M ↓ B
 ′ 
	
M ↓ A −◦ B  ′′ 
	
N ⇑ A  =  ′   ′′
oa lapp
 
	
M ˆN ↓ B
 
	
M ↓ x : A. B  
	
N ⇑ A
oa iapp
 
	
M N ↓ NF([N/x]B)
FIG. 9. Canonical deduction system for λ&, objects.
Another novelty of the canonical system is the absence of a rule corresponding to oaa c, the coercion
from precanonical to preatomic terms. We already saw that only through this rule can we show the
validity of terms containing β-redices. Without it, the canonical system can only derive η-long terms
that are β-normal, i.e., canonical, as the name of this system implies.
An important consequence of the elimination of oaa c is that the resulting system is syntax-directed:
any judgment matches the conclusion of at most one inference rule.
The equivalence between the algorithmic and the canonical system in Figs. 8 and 9 is expressed by
means of the following soundness and completeness theorems.
THEOREM 2.6 (Soundness of the canonical system).
i. If  	 ⇑ Sig, 	  ⇑ Ctx and C ::  	 U ⇑↓ V, then  a	 U ⇑↓ V .
ii. If  	 ⇑ Sig and C :: 	  ⇑ Ctx, then a	  ⇑ Ctx.
iii. If C ::  	 ⇑ Sig, then a 	 ⇑ Sig.
Moreover, 	, , U, and V are in normal form.
Proof. By induction on the structure of C.
The converse of this statement is not true in general. It holds, however, whenever all the entities
appearing in a derivable algorithmic judgment are in normal form. We know by the normal form
corollary 2.3 that every derivable judgment in that system is equivalent to a judgment that mentions
only normal terms. Therefore, the correspondence between the algorithmic and the canonical system is
not perfect, since it preserves derivability but not derivations, in general. This is, however, acceptable
for our purposes since, when performing search and when encoding a deductive system, we are only
interested in terms that are η-long and β-normal, i.e., canonical.
44 CERVESATO AND PFENNING
THEOREM 2.7 (Completeness of the canonical system).
i. If  a	 M ⇑↓ A, then
• if A is a base type, then NF() NF(	) NF(M) ⇑↓ A;
• if NF(M) = 〈 〉 or 〈M ′, M ′′〉 or ˆλu : A′.M ′ or λx : A′.M ′, then NF() NF(	) NF(M) ⇑ A;
• if NF(M) = x or c or FST M ′ or SND M ′ or M ′ˆM ′′ or M ′ M ′′, then NF() NF(	) NF(M) ↓ A.
ii. If ¯ a	 A ⇑↓ K , then NF( ¯) NF(	) NF(A) ⇑↓ K .
iii. If ¯ a	 K ⇑ Kind, then NF( ¯) NF(	) NF(K ) ⇑ Kind.
iv. If a	  ⇑ Ctx, then NF(	) NF() ⇑ Ctx.
v. If a 	 ⇑ Sig, then  NF(	) ⇑ Sig.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the given judgments after applying the normal forms
corollary 2.3 and taking into consideration the admissibility of rule oaa c, which derives from the
analogous property of rule opa c in the precanonical system.
We will adopt the system presented in this section to compare the features of LLF to LF. We will
rely on a canonical system adapted from [39] for our comparison. Details can be found in [6]. We
will distinguish the λ equivalents of the judgments presented earlier by annotating them with the
superscript LF.
All syntactic entities of λ are available in our language. This embedding is maintained at the level
of judgments. The canonical system for λ& in Figs. 8 and 9 differs from the corresponding λ
system only by the addition of rules that deal with the linear entities of our language. Therefore, every
judgment derivable in λ has an isomorphic derivation in λ&.
THEOREM 2.8 (Extension over LF).
i. If LF ::  LF	 U ⇑↓ V, then  	 U ⇑↓ V .
ii. If LF :: LF	  ⇑ Ctx, then 	  ⇑ Ctx.
iii. If LF :: LF 	 ⇑ Sig, then  	 ⇑ Sig.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of LF . All cases are immediate as soon as we
notice that, for a λ context , we have that ¯ = .
LLF has also the converse property of being conservative over LF; i.e., every derivable λ&
judgment that mentions only entities in the λ fragment of the syntax has a corresponding derivation
in λ. This also entails that every judgment that is not derivable in LF remains such in LLF.
THEOREM 2.9 (Conservativity over LF). Let 	, , U, and V be an LF signature, an LF context, and
two LF terms, respectively; then
i. If C ::  	 U ⇑↓ V, then  LF	 U ⇑↓ V .
ii. If C :: 	  ⇑ Ctx, then LF	  ⇑ Ctx.
iii. If C ::  	 ⇑ Sig, then LF 	 ⇑ Sig.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of C. We need to remember that for an LF context
, we have that ¯ = .
These properties have important consequences. Not only every judgment derivable in LF is derivable
also in our language, but, more important, all the representation techniques, adequacy theorems, and
examples developed for LF remain valid for LLF.
2.9. A Concrete Syntax for LLF
In this section, we extend the concrete syntax of Elf [41] to express the linear operators of LLF.
In doing so, we want to fulfill two constraints: first of all, existing Elf programs should not undergo
any syntactic alteration (unless they declare some of the reserved identifiers that we will introduce)
if we were to execute them in an implementation of LLF relying on the new syntax. In other words,
the extension we propose should be conservative with respect to the syntax of Elf. Second, we want to
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Abstract syntax Concrete syntax
Kinds
TYPE type
x : A. K {x:A}K A -> K K <- A
P M P M
 <T>
Types A & B A & B
A −◦ B A -o B B o- A
x : A. B {x:A}B A -> B B <- A
〈〉 ()
〈M, N 〉 M,N
FST M <fst> M
Objects SND M <snd> M
ˆλx : A. M [x^A]M
M ˆN M ^ N
λx : A. M [x:A]M
M N M N
FIG. 10. Concrete syntax for LLF.
avoid a proliferation of operators: keeping their number as small as possible will make future extensions
easier to accommodate if their inclusion appears beneficial.
The set of special characters of Elf consists of % : . ) ( ] [ } {. We extend these with two
symbols: , and ^. λ& object and type family constants are consequently represented as identifiers
consisting of any nonempty string that does not contain spaces or the characters % : . ) ( ] [ }
{ , ^. As in Elf, identifiers must be separated from each other by whitespace (i.e., blanks, tabs, and new
lines) or special characters. We augment the set of reserved identifiers of Elf (type, -> and <-) with
<T>, &, −◦, ◦−, <fst>, and <snd>. Although not properly an identifier, the symbol () is also reserved;
this string is forbidden in Elf.
Figure 10 associates every λ& operator to its concrete representation. Terms in the λ sublan-
guage of LLF are mapped to the syntax of Elf. This language offers the convenience of writing -> as
<- with the arguments reversed in order to give a more operational reading to a program, when desired:
under this perspective, we read the expression A <- B as “A if B.” We extend this possibility to linear
implication, −◦. Clearly, when we use ◦−, the arguments should be swapped: A ◦− B is syntactic sugar
for B −◦ A.
Figure 11 gives the relative precedence and associativity of these operators. As in Elf, parentheses
are available to override these behaviors.
Precedence Operator Position
highest <fst> <snd> prefix
^ left associative
& right associative
-o -> right associative
o- <- left associative
{ : } [ : ] [ ^ ] prefix
lowest , right associative
FIG. 11. Concrete syntax for LLF.
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As in Elf, a signature declaration c : A is represented by the program clause:
c : A.
Type family constants are declared similarly. For practical purposes, it is convenient to provide a
means of declaring linear assumptions. Indeed, whenever the object formalism we want to represent
requires numerous linear hypotheses, it is simpler to write them as program clauses than to rely on
some initialization routine that assumes them in the context during its execution. To this end, we permit
declarations of the form
c ˆ A.
with the intent that this declaration should be inserted in the context as a linear assumption.
We retain from Elf the use of % for comments and interpreter directives. We adopt the conventions
available in that language in order to enhance the readability of LLF programs [38]. In particular, we
permit keeping the type of bound variables implicit whenever they can be effectively reconstructed by
means techniques akin to those currently implemented in Elf [38]. We write {x}B, [x]B, and [xˆ ]B
when maintaining implicit the type A of the variable x in {x : A}B, [x : A]B, and [xˆA]B, respectively.
Similar conventions apply to dependent kinds. As in Elf, the binders for variables quantified at the head
of a clause can be omitted altogether if we write these variables with identifiers starting with a capital
letter. Moreover, the arguments instantiating them can be kept implicit when using these declarations.
Finally, we relax the requirement of writing LLF declarations only in η-long form. With sufficient
typing information it is always possible to transform a signature to that format.
3. THE METHODOLOGY OF LINEAR META-REPRESENTATION
LF and Elf constitute a useful tool for studying existing logics and programming languages and an
ideal playground for experimenting with alternative constructs in the design phase of new languages.
The range of practical applicability of these formalisms is limited by their foundation on intuitionistic
type theory. All the formal systems that have been successfully encoded in LF (functional and logic
programming languages [33, 39], λ-calculi [40], and a number of logics [27, 43]) share a fundamental
characteristic: whenever a judgment mentions a context, a bottom-up reading of the inference rules for
it may add items, but it never removes assumptions. We call contexts with this property permanent,
in contrast with volatile contexts, free from this restriction. Object formalisms admitting arbitrary
operations on their context cannot be effectively encoded in LF: the standard technique, representing
object context items as LF assumptions, is not sound in this case since LF assumptions are permanent.
The alternative is to represent the object context as a term in LF and implement explicitly the operations
required to access and manipulate it. This is undesirable since it makes the adequacy results difficult to
prove and often complicates the encoding of meta-theoretic properties to the point of making it hardly
manageable in practice.
This situation is quite unfortunate since most formalisms of practical significance rely on a volatile
context in an essential manner. The languages used for programming commercial applications are
imperative: they have a store and assignment instructions to change the value of variables. Most real-
world problems carry a state that changes with time. Many new logics and type theories are inherently
bound to destructive context manipulations. Permanent contexts are insufficient even for more traditional
formalisms, for example when studying efficient proof–search procedures for intuitionistic logic [17].
The linear type theory λ& presented in the previous section retains all the desirable properties
of LF and also augments this formalism with linear assumptions, admitting volatile manipulations, and
with a suitable set of operators to manage them. These new features overcome the above deficiency
of LF: if we represent the volatile context of an object language as linear assumptions in λ&,
destructive context operations in the object formalism can be modeled by an appropriate combination
of linear operators.
The linear logical framework LLF is founded on the type theory λ& and combines as its meta-
representation methodology the judgments-as-types technique of LF with the above observation. The
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present section illustrates the added expressiveness of LLF as a logical framework by describing
the meta-representation methodology it adopts, first abstractly and then on a concrete case study.
The formalism we want to represent is an imperative extension of Mini-ML [25, 33, 39], a purely
functional restriction of the programming language ML [23, 36]. More precisely, we augment that lan-
guage with a store and imperative instructions to access and modify the values it contains, we formalize
the typing and evaluation semantics of these constructs, and we show that this extended language enjoys
the type preservation property. We call this language MLR, for Mini-ML with References. The linear
assumptions of LLF can be used to encode individual memory cells and the linear operators of our type
theory offer effective tools to model manipulations on them.
We review the judgments-as-types representation methodology and extend it to handle volatile as-
sumptions in Section 3.1. Then, we give a detailed but informal presentation of the syntax, semantics,
and type preservation property for MLR in Section 3.2. Finally, we show how to encode these different
aspects in LLF in Section 3.7. Appendix A contains the complete LLF signature for this example. In
the following, we will concentrate mainly on the novel constructions available in MLR, referring the
reader to the literature [13, 25, 33, 39] for aspects already present in Mini-ML.
3.1. Judgments-as-Types Revisited
We will review the technique of judgments-as-types of LF [27] by analyzing the following simplified
rule of inference from the case study in this section:
, x : τ e e : τ
 e fix x .e : τ tpe fix
Ignoring for the moment the context , it specifies that the fix-point expression fix x .e has type τ if e
has type τ assuming that the variable x has also type τ . We will emphasize the fact that x can occur
in e by writing e(x). Given a closed expression fix x .e(x), the judgment in the conclusion of tpe fix
postulates that fix x .e(x) has type τ (we need to provide a derivation to ascertain that this is indeed the
case). We call such a judgment simple. The judgments-as-types representation methodology encodes
simple judgments as λ base types. In Section 3.7, we will use the type family constants EXP and TP,
both of kind TYPE to classify the expressions and the types of the object language, respectively. The
general form of the typing judgment above relates an expression and a type, and therefore we encode it
as a type family TPE, of kind EXP → TP → TYPE. Given representations (FIX λx : EXP. ex) and τ (to
be explained below) for the closed expression fix x .e(x) and for the object language type τ , the simple
judgment  e fix x .e(x) : τ is represented as
TPE(FIX(λx : EXP.ex))τ.
The judgment in the premise of rule tpe fix is different in nature. Indeed, it specifies that the ex-
pression e(x) has type τ if we assume that the variable x has also type τ . A judgment of this form is
called hypothetical. Notice also that x is a bound variable in fix x .e(x), but it is free in e(x). Therefore,
that premise expresses the fact that e(x) has type τ for a generic expression x of type τ . The judgment
, x :τ e e(x) : τ is therefore said to be also parametric in x . The judgments-as-types representa-
tion methodology encodes hypothetical and parametric judgments by means of simple and dependent
function types, respectively. The premise of the rule above, which is parametric in x and hypothetical
in x : τ , is represented as follows:
x : EXP.TPE xτ → TPE(ex)τ
Notice that instantiating the parameter x with some term e′ yields a hypothetical judgment postulating
that e(e′) has type τ assuming that e′ has type τ . This reduces to a simple judgment as soon as we
provide a derivation for this hypothesis.
An attempt at finding a canonical LF derivation with the above type reduces to searching for a
derivation for the base type TPE (ex) τ after having added the assumptions x : EXP and tx : TPE x τ
to the context of LF. Viewing this as an alternate encoding for the premise of rule tpe fix illustrates the
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manner an object context is encoded according to the judgments-as-types methodology: each item in
the context of the object formalism is represented as one or more assumptions in the context of LF. This
technique offers the further advantage that we can rely on the primitive operations of LF to simulate the
lookup of object level assumptions. Less sophisticated representations, for example those that encode
the object context as a term, must provide explicit access operations.
Observe that rule tpe fix can be read as a judgment that is parametric in the (functional) expression e
and the type τ , and hypothetical in the derivability of its premise. Indeed, it is encoded as the following
declaration
TPE FIX : e:EXP → EXP.τ : TP.
(x : EXP.TPE xτ → TPE(ex)τ )
→ TPE (FIX(λx : EXP.ex))τ
or, taking advantage of the concrete syntax of Elf (see Section 2.9),
tpe fix : ({x:exp} tpe x T -> tpe (E x) T)
-> tpe (fix ([x:exp] E x)) T.
In summary, the judgments-as-types representation methodology for LF encodes simple judgments as
base types, hypothetical and parametric judgments as simple and dependent function types, respectively,
and elements of the object context as items in the context of LF. Moreover, derivations for a simple
judgment are naturally represented as terms of the corresponding base type.
The judgments-as-types methodology interacts particularly well with higher-order abstract syntax,
a technique for the representation of the syntactic level of an object formalism that encodes object
variables as meta-variables and relies on the λ-abstraction of λ to emulate generic object-level binding
constructs. Above, we encoded the fix-point expression fix x .e(x), that binds the variable x in e(x) as
(FIX (λx : EXP.ex)). We used the λ-abstraction of LF to express binding, and consequently encoded
the operator fix by means of the LF constant fix that accepts a functional operator (fix : (exp
-> exp) -> exp).
The faithfulness of the representation of an object formalism is captured by means of adequacy
theorems that relate the entities being represented to their encoding. An important advantage of the
judgments-as-types technique with respect to less sophisticated approaches is that it produces encodings
very close to the notations being formalized. This makes the adequacy theorems easy to prove.
Here, and in the remainder of this paper, we view and describe operations on the context as they arise
when we construct derivations “bottom-up,” that is, from the judgment in question toward the axioms.
This view is the most natural one to elucidate the examples and anticipates the logic programming
interpretation of LLF. For example, instead of saying that we discharge a hypothesis in rule opc ilam
in Fig. 2 we say that we introduce a hypothesis. From this point of view, λ offers two operations on its
context: insertion and lookup. In particular, the context can only grow during the bottom-up construction
of a derivation. Therefore, the judgments-as-types methodology in λ cannot capture object languages
that perform deletion on their context. Consider as an example the following inference rule, taken from
the case study in the next section:
(S, c = v)  K  return〈 〉 ↪→ a
(S, c = v′)  K  c :=∗2 v ↪→ a
ev assign∗2
This rule describes the semantics of assignment in an imperative programming language (further details
will be given in the next section). It specifies that, in order to assign the value v to the cell c, we
must update the binding c = v′ in the store with c = v; some uninteresting value is returned. An
elegant encoding of this system in LF would represent each cell–value pair in the store as a meta-level
assumption. However, λ does not provide means to simulate the deletion of the old binding, c = v′.
In contrast, we can easily achieve this effect in LLF. Indeed, looking up a linear assumption in λ&
removes it from the context. This suggests encoding each cell–value pair c = v present at any instant
in the store of the object language as an LLF linear assumption Cn :ˆ contains c v.
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The linear type constructors of λ& provide the necessary means to manipulate such assumptions.
We rely on to enter them in the context of LLF and take advantage of the context splitting semantics
of this operator to isolate them in order to access them. The additive product type constructor, &, offers
means to duplicate or share linear assumptions among its two conjuncts. This operator can also be used
to express selection between exclusive alternatives, although we will not take advantage of this feature
here. Finally, the unit type, , permits discarding unused linear hypotheses.
These different features will be illustrated in detail in Section 3.7. We just show the encoding of the
rule above:
ev assign*2 : (contains C V -o ev K (return unit) A)
-o (contains C V’ -o ev K (assign*2 (rf C) V) A).
The linearity of our logical framework can be integrated into higher-order abstract syntax as a
convenient manner of encoding languages relying on linear binders [6]. When they are not needed we
can just use the LF fragment of LLF exactly as before.
3.2. Mini-ML with References
Critical choices in the implementation of programming languages depend on the validity of meta-
theoretic properties. Type preservation in Standard ML [23, 36], for example, guarantees that no typing
error can arise during evaluation; therefore execution can be sped up significantly by disregarding type
information at run-time. Meta-theoretic properties in the presence of nonfunctional features, included in
most concrete languages, are difficult to prove and therefore the formal analysis of imperative extensions
of purely functional programming languages has received great attention in the literature. The addition
of references and their interaction with polymorphism have been analyzed with different tools, ranging
from the complex domain-theoretic approach of Damas [15] to the syntactic formulation of Harper [26].
The latter idea was adapted from Wright and Felleisen, who additionally consider continuations and
exceptions [54].
The proofs of these properties are long and error-prone. Therefore, recent work has investigated the
possibility of partially automating their generation or at least their verification. Chirimar gives Forum
specifications for a language with references, exceptions, and continuations and uses the meta-theory
of Forum [34] to study program equivalence [12]. VanInwegen [52] formally proves properties such
as value soundness (the fact that evaluating an expression yields a value, if it terminates) for most of
Standard ML with the help of the HOL theorem prover [24].
In this section, we define MLR as an extension of Mini-ML with references and imperative instructions
and study aspects of its meta-theory. Although our principal objective is to demonstrate the expressive
power of LLF, our presentation differs in some aspects from the formulations and proofs in the literature
and therefore might be interesting in itself. We will point out differences and similarities with other
approaches as they arise.
3.3. Expressions and Store
Since its introduction in [13], the language Mini-ML and variants of it have been used for case studies
in the presentation of logical frameworks [25, 33, 39]. Mini-ML is a purely functional restriction of
the programming language ML [23, 36]. More specifically, it is a small statically typed functional
programming language including numerals, conditional expressions, pairs, polymorphic definitions,
recursion, and functional expressions.
We consider an extension of Mini-ML with a store and imperative instructions in the style of ML to
access and modify the values it contains. We call this language Mini-ML with References, or MLR for
short. The store of an MLR program is defined as a collection of cells each containing a value. We will
sometimes use location or address as synonyms of cell. MLR makes available all the constructs of Mini-
ML but enriches the syntax of its expressions with the necessary operations to manipulate individual
cells. The resulting language is specified by the following grammar, where we have separated out the
constructs not present in standard presentations of Mini-ML with a double bar (‖). Cells c and stores S
are not directly accessible to the programmer, but it is customary and convenient to enrich the syntax
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in order to represent intermediate stages during computation.
Expressions: e ::= x (Variables)
|z|s e (Natural numbers)
|case e of z ⇒ e1| s x ⇒ e2 (Conditionals)
|〈 〉 (Unit element)
|〈e1, e2〉| fst e| snd e (Pairs)
| lam x .e|e1e2 (Functions)
| letval x = e1in e2 | (Definitions)letname x = e1in e2
| fix x .e (Recursion)
‖c| ref e|!e (References)
|e1 := e2|e1; e2 (Commands)
Stores: S ::= ·|S, c = v
In these productions, c ranges over the lexical category of memory locations, while we use the let-
ter x for variables. The meta-variable v denotes values, which we will define shortly. We will treat
stores as multisets, omit the leading “·” from a nonempty store, and overload “,” to denote the union
of two stores. Finally, we require the cells appearing on the left-hand side of a store item to be
distinct.
The polymorphism in MLR is restricted to values, which is generally accepted as superior to the
imperative type variables present in previous versions of SML [31]. We achieve this by distinguishing
two forms of let. The expression ref e dynamically allocates a cell and initializes it with the value of
e. The contents of a cell can be inspected by dereferencing it with ! and modified with an assignment
(:=). Different, from [54], but consistent with the main stream in the literature (including the definition
of Standard ML [36]), we choose this operation not to return the assigned object, but the unit element
〈 〉. The sequencing operator (;) is typically used as a means of chaining a series of assignments with
some interesting final value; it is syntactic sugar for the expression (letval x = e1 in e2) when x does
not occur in e2. As is normally the case in functional languages, MLR does not offer explicit means to
deallocate memory cells.
All these constructs are available in Standard ML [36] with the exception of addresses themselves
(c), which cannot be manipulated directly in that language. We require MLR programs not to mention
locations directly so that cells are always guaranteed to be initialized. Thus cells are created dynam-
ically with ref and can be named by binding them to variables with one of the two let constructs
of MLR.
As in ML, the reference cells of MLR encompass two distinct features of imperative programming
languages such as C or Pascal. First of all, they play the role of the imperative variables of these
languages and can be used as such (except for the necessity of dereferencing them explicitly in order to
access their value). Second, we can use them as pointers in data structures, although their usefulness is
rather limited in this respect due to the absence of recursive data types in MLR. Such data structures
could be easily added to the language.
3.4. Typing
The language of types of MLR augments the typing constructs typically present in Mini-ML, namely
natural numbers, unit, pairing, and functional types, with one new constructor: for each type τ , the type
τ ref for references to objects of type τ . The syntax of types is summarized in the following grammar:
Types : τ :: = α | nat | 1 | τ1 × τ2 | τ1 → τ2
‖ τ ref
We use type variables to express schematic polymorphism. We eliminate an explicit quantifier in favor
of substitution in the typing rule for the letname construct (see Fig. 12). On the basis of this definition,
the static semantics of MLR naturally extends the traditional typing rules of Mini-ML. The possibility
of expressions to mention cells requires introducing a store context as a means to declare the type of
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Expressions
tpe x
; , x :τ e x : τ
tpe unit
;  e 〈〉 : 1
tpe z
;  e z : nat
;  e e : nat
tpe s
;  e s e : nat
;  e e : nat ;  e e1 : τ ; , x :nat e e2 : τ
tpe case
;  e case e of z ⇒ e1 | s x ⇒ e2 : τ
;  e e1 : τ1 ;  e e2 : τ2
tpe pair
;  e 〈e1, e2〉 : τ1 × τ2
;  e e : τ1 × τ2
tpe fst
;  e fst e : τ1
;  e e : τ1 × τ2
tpe snd
;  e snd e : τ2
; , x :τ1 e e : τ2
tpe lam
;  e lam x . e : τ1 → τ2
;  e e1 : τ2 → τ1 ;  e e2 : τ2
tpe app
;  e e1 e2 : τ1
;  e e1 : τ1 ; , x :τ1 e e2 : τ2
tpe letval
;  e letval x = e1 in e2 : τ2
;  e [e1/x]e2 : τ
tpe letname
;  e letname x = e1 in e2 : τ
; , x :τ e e : τ
tpe fix
;  e fix x . e : τ
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
tpe cell
, c :τ ;  e c : τ ref
;  e e : τ
tpe ref
;  e ref e : τ ref
;  e e : τ ref
tpe deref
;  e !e : τ
;  e e1 : τ1 ;  e e2 : τ2
tpe seq
;  e e1; e2 : τ2
;  e e1 : τ ref ;  e e2 : τ
tpe assign
;  e e1 := e2 : 1
Store
tpS empty
 S · : ·
 S S : ′ ; · e v : τ
tpS cell
 S (S, c = v) : (′, c :τ )
FIG. 12. Typing rules in MLR, expressions and store.
free locations. More precisely, the item c : τ in a store context declares τ as the type of the values that
c can contain; c itself has consequently type τ ref. Contexts, as usual, assign types to free variables.
They are constructed according to the following grammar:
Contexts:  ::= · | , x : τ
Store contexts:  ::= · | , c : τ
We rely on the usual convention that the names of the variables and the cells declared in stores and
context stores, respectively, are distinct. Moreover, we treat both forms of contexts as multisets.
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We express the fact that the MLR expression e has type τ with respect to a store context  and a
context  with the judgment
;  e e : τ.
The presence of a store context in the typing rules for MLR is necessary even if we forbid the users to
write addresses directly in their programs. It accounts for cells dynamically allocated during evaluation,
which may appear in intermediate results and in the final answer.
The inference rules for the typing judgment are displayed in Fig. 12. The upper part of this figure
shows the rules for the functional core of MLR. The changes with respect to the usual rules for Mini-ML
are limited to the systematic inclusion of a store context in the judgments.
The central part of Fig. 12 shows the rules for the novel features of MLR. As for the functional case,
they express the conditions under which an expression can be statically accepted as meaningful. For
example, rule tpe deref enforces that only references be dereferenced.
In the lower part of Fig. 12, we present the rules for typing a store. The judgments we consider have
the form
′ S S : 
that we interpret as requiring that the type of each value v stored in S coincides with the type of the
corresponding cell as specified in . The store context ′ gives the type of the cells v may mention.
We will always be interested in top-level judgments of the form  S S :  since a store will in general
refer circularly to its own cells. Rule tpS cell prevents expressions containing free variables from being
inserted in the store.
3.5. Evaluation
An MLR expression e will in general mention reference cells whose values are contained in the store.
The evaluation of e will typically not only retrieve these values, but also change them or create new
cells. Therefore, as e is evaluated, the store will undergo transformations, and by the time a value for e
is eventually produced, it might appear very different from the store we started with. This observation
suggests an evaluation judgment of the form
S; e ↪→ S′; v,
where S is the store prior to evaluating e, and S′ results from the evaluation of e to v: cells in e refer to
S while cells in v refer to S′. This formulation extends the traditional evaluation judgment for Mini-ML
[25, 33, 39].
The dynamic semantics of functional languages enriched with imperative features, such as MLR’s
references, is normally expressed in the literature in this manner. We will instead adopt a different
strategy and present the reductions occurring during the execution of an MLR program as continuation-
based evaluation rules. This choice has been dictated by our intention to encode the semantics of MLR
in LLF. A direct representation of the judgment above, although possible, would have resulted in a less
elegant encoding. For similar reasons, Chirimar [12] also chose a continuation-based formulation.
Different from more declarative formulations, a continuation-based execution strategy imposes a
strict order of evaluation on the different subexpressions of any given construct in the language. This
order respects the expected flow of data and is therefore natural. For example, when computing the
value of an expression of the form (letval x = e1 in e2) we will first evaluate e1, obtain a value v′,
substitute it for x in e2, and only then evaluate the resulting expression.
An effective implementation of this strategy requires sequentializing the evaluation of the subex-
pressions of constructs with more than one argument. One of them is evaluated immediately while the
evaluation of the others is postponed until a value has been produced for it. Clearly, if a subexpression
depends on the value of another, we process it last. We realize this idea by maintaining a stack of
expressions to be evaluated, called a continuation.
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Postponing the evaluation of an expression e2 in favor of another expression e1 is achieved by pushing
the former into the continuation. Since, as when evaluating (letval x = e1 in e2) for example, the value
of e1 might need to be substituted for some free variable x in e2, we wrap a binder for x around
e2 and thus insert an object of the form λx .e2 into the continuation (or compose it with the current
continuation, depending on whether the continuation is viewed as a stack of functions or as a single
function corresponding to their composition). For uniformity, it is convenient to take this measure every
time we insert an item into the stack. As soon as e1 has been fully evaluated to a value v, λx .e2 is
extracted from the continuation, v is substituted for the variable x in e2, and [v/x]e2 is evaluated in turn.
The necessity of distinguishing expressions still to be evaluated from values being returned requires
the introduction of the new syntactic layer of instructions. Specifically, we write eval e for the request
to evaluate an expression e and denote the intention to return a value v as return v. Instructions are
needed also for the purpose of handling partially evaluated expressions.
While evaluating a Mini-ML expression simply yielded a value, MLR expressions will in general
produce objects mentioning cells. Therefore the result of the evaluation of an instruction i must include
not only a final value v but also a reification [S′] of the final store S′ it draws its references from;
moreover, as a measure of hygiene, we mark the cells c that have been introduced during the evaluation
process by binding them in front of the pair ([S′], v) by means of the new c. operator. The resulting
object is called an answer and is indicated with the letter a. For our purposes, [S′] will be a sequence
obtained by ordering the elements of S′ according to some arbitrary order. It is, however, conceivable
that only the cells that contribute to the final value be kept, realizing in this way a form of garbage
collection.
The structure of instructions, continuations, and answers is given by the following grammar, where
we have indicated with the double bar the instructions introduced in correspondence to the imperative
constructs of MLR.
Instructions : i ::= eval e | return v
| case∗v of z ⇒ e1| s x ⇒ e2
| 〈v, e〉∗ | fst∗v | snd∗ v
| app∗ v e
‖ ref∗ v | deref∗ v | v :=∗1 e | v1 :=∗2 v2
Continuations : K ::= init | K , λx .i
Answers : a ::= ([S], v) | new c.a
The typing rules for objects in these three categories are displayed in Fig. 13. Notice that the type of an
answer coincides with the type of the embedded value. Rule tpa val requires that the store it is paired
with be well typed, while rule tpa new constrains every occurrence of the cells bound in an answer to
be consistently typed.
Values constitute the subclass of expressions that evaluate to themselves. They are specified by the
following grammar.
Values: v ::= x | z | s v | 〈 〉 | 〈v1, v2〉 | lam x .e
‖ c
On the basis of this definition, we can justify the uses of the term “value” in the above presentation. Not
only does return operate only on values, but computation places a value at the heart of answers and the
contents of every cell in the store are a value. See [6] for a formal statement of these properties.
We model the continuation-based semantics of the imperative constructs of MLR by means of a
judgment of the form
S  K  i ↪→ a,
where i is the instruction to be executed, K is the current continuation, S is the store with respect to
which i is to be evaluated, and a is the final answer produced as the result of the evaluation.
The inference rules for evaluation are given in Figs. 14 and 15. The evaluation of most instructions
in the functional core of MLR does not access the store. The only exception is rule ev init which must
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Instructions
;  e e : τ
tpi eval
;  i eval e : τ
;  e v : τ
tpi return
;  i return v : τ
;  e v : nat ;  e e1 : τ ; , x :nat e e2 : τ
tpi case∗
;  i case∗ v of z ⇒ e1 | s x ⇒ e2 : τ
;  e v : τ1 ;  e e : τ2
tpi pair∗
;  i 〈v, e〉∗ : τ1 × τ2
;  e v : τ1 × τ2
tpi fst∗
;  i fst∗ v : τ1
;  e v : τ1 × τ2
tpi snd∗
;  i snd∗ v : τ2
;  e v : τ2 → τ1 ;  e e : τ2
tpi app∗
;  i app∗ v e : τ1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
;  e v : τ
tpi ref∗
;  i ref ∗ v : τ ref
;  e v : τ ref
tpi deref∗
;  i deref ∗ v : τ
;  e v : τ ref ;  e e : τ
tpi assign1∗
;  i v :=∗1 e : 1
;  e v1 : τ ref ;  e v2 : τ
tpi assign2∗
;  i v1 :=∗2 v2 : 1
Continuations
tpK init
 K init : τ ⇒ τ
; x :τ1 i i : τ  K K : τ ⇒ τ2
tpK lam
 K K , λx . i : τ1 ⇒ τ2
Answers
 S S :  ; · e v : τ
tpa val
 a ([S], v) : τ
, c :τ ′ a a : τ
tpa new
 a new c. a : τ
FIG. 13. Typing rules in MLR, instructions, continuations and answers.
package the current store together with the produced value in order to construct the final answer. More
generally, this operation could also include garbage collection, but we do not pursue this possibility
here.
The inference rules concerned with nonfunctional expressions of MLR and the corresponding in-
structions are separated out by a dotted line in Figs. 14 and 15, respectively.
Cells (rule ev cell) simply evaluate to themselves, like any value. The sequencing instruction e1; e2
has a simple semantics too: it evaluates e1, disregards the returned value, and then proceeds with the
evaluation of e2 (rule ev seq).
The evaluation of ref e computes the value v of e (rule ev ref), allocates a new cell c in the store,
initializes it with v and finally returns c itself (rule ev ref∗). Notice that rule ev ref∗ has also the effect of
binding c in the final answer by means of new c. . The argument part of !e is evaluated to a reference cell
(rule ev deref) and the value associated to it is returned (rule ev deref∗). We rely on the auxiliary read
judgment S  c = v in order to retrieve the value of a cell (rule read val). The evaluation of e1 := e2
first evaluates e1 to a store location c (rule ev assign), computes the value v of e2 (rule ev assign∗1), and
replaces the former contents of c with v (rule ev assign∗2). The returned value is 〈 〉.
We conclude our discussion about evaluation with a few words about the interaction of references
and polymorphism. The question is subtle and has received great attention in the literature [26, 31, 50].
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Expressions
(No ev x) S  K  return z ↪→ a ev z
S  K  eval z ↪→ a
S  K , λx . return s x  eval e ↪→ a
ev s
S  K  eval s e ↪→ a
S  K , λy. case∗ y of z ⇒ e1 | s x ⇒ e2  eval e ↪→ a
ev case
S  K  eval case e of z ⇒ e1 | s x ⇒ e2 ↪→ a
S  K  return 〈〉 ↪→ a
ev unit
S  K  eval 〈〉 ↪→ a
S  K , λx . 〈x, e2〉∗  eval e1 ↪→ a
ev pair
S  K  eval 〈e1, e2〉 ↪→ a
S  K , λx . fst∗ x  eval e ↪→ a
ev fst
S  K  eval fst e ↪→ a
S  K , λx . snd∗ x  eval e ↪→ a
ev snd
S  K  eval snd e ↪→ a
S  K  return lam x . e ↪→ a
ev lam
S  K  eval lam x . e ↪→ a
S  K , λx . app∗ x e2  eval e1 ↪→ a
ev app
S  K  eval e1 e2 ↪→ a
S  K , λx . eval e2  eval e1 ↪→ a
ev letval
S  K  eval letval x = e1 in e2 ↪→ a
S  K  eval [e1/x]e2 ↪→ a
ev letname
S  K  eval letname x = e1 in e2 ↪→ a
S  K  eval [fix x . e/x]e ↪→ a
ev fix
S  K  eval fix x . e ↪→ a
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
S  K  return c ↪→ a
ev cell
S  K  eval c ↪→ a
S  K , λx . ref ∗ x  eval e ↪→ a
ev ref
S  K  eval ref e ↪→ a
S  K , λx . deref ∗ x  eval e ↪→ a
ev deref
S  K  eval !e ↪→ a
S  K , λx . eval e2  eval e1 ↪→ a
ev seq
S  K  eval e1; e2 ↪→ a
S  K , λx . x :=∗1 e2  eval e1 ↪→ a
ev assign
S  K  eval e1 := e2 ↪→ a
FIG. 14. Evaluation in MLR, expressions.
Consider for example the following MLR expression:
letname f = ref (lam x .x)
in f := lam x .s x ;
! f 〈 〉
At first sight, this expression allocates a cell and initializes it with the identity function, which has
polymorphic type α → α. In the body of letname, we first update it to the successor function, of type
nat → nat, and then apply it to 〈 〉, of type 1. Clearly, something is wrong, but the typing rules of
MLR accept the program above as a correct expression of type 1. Is there a flaw in the definition of the
static semantics of our language? Fortunately, no. A closer analysis reveals that, since the evaluation of
letname substitutes ref (lam x .x) for every occurrence of f in its body, the expression above reduces
to:
ref (lam x .x) := lam x .s x ;
(!ref (lam x .x))〈 〉
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Values
ev init
S  init  return v ↪→ ([S], v)
S  K  [v/x]i ↪→ a
ev cont
S  K , λx . i  return v ↪→ a
Auxiliary instructions
S  K  eval e1 ↪→ a
ev case∗1
S  K  case∗ z of z ⇒ e1 | s x ⇒ e2 ↪→ a
S  K  eval [v/x]e2 ↪→ a
ev case∗2
S  K  case∗ s v of z ⇒ e1 | s x ⇒ e2 ↪→ a
S  K , λx . return 〈v, x〉  eval e ↪→ a
ev pair∗
S  K  〈v, e〉∗ ↪→ a
S  K  return v1 ↪→ a
ev fst∗
S  K  fst∗ 〈v1, v2〉 ↪→ a
S  K  return v2 ↪→ a
ev snd∗
S  K  snd∗ 〈v1, v2〉 ↪→ a
S  K , λx . eval e1  eval e2 ↪→ a
ev app∗
S  K  app∗ (lam x . e1) e2 ↪→ a
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(S, c = v) K  return c ↪→ a
ev ref∗
S  K  ref ∗ v ↪→ new c. a
S  c = v S  K  return v ↪→ a
ev deref∗
S  K  deref ∗ c ↪→ a
S  K , λx . c :=∗2 x  eval e ↪→ a
ev assign∗1
S  K  c :=∗1 e ↪→ a
(S, c = v) K  return 〈〉 ↪→ a
ev assign∗2
(S, c = v′) K  c :=∗2 v ↪→ a
Read
read val
(S, c = v)  c = v
FIG. 15. Evaluation in MLR, values and auxiliary instructions.
Each occurrence of ref (lam x .x) evaluates to a different cell that is typed according to its use. The
expression above would not be typable if we had used letval in place of letname.
Languages with explicit type variables solve the same problem by distinguishing between applicative
and imperative type variables in order to avoid problems such as the above [23, 26, 36]. Restricting
polymorphism to values has also been proposed as a solution to this problem [50] and has been adopted in
the current definition of Standard ML [36]. This language offers only one form of let, but it takes different
courses of action depending on whether it defines a value or an arbitrary expression. Our treatment is
slightly more general since it makes the call-by-name semantics of letname directly available: for
example, the above expression does not type-check in SML.
3.6. Type Preservation
We conclude this section with the statement of the type preservation theorem for MLR and of the
lemmas it depends on. For reasons of space, we will not formalize the proof of these results in LLF.
The interested reader can find an encoding of this proof in our linear logical framework in [6].
The type preservation theorem states that the type of an expression does not change as the result
of evaluation. The proof of the type preservation theorem relies on a number of auxiliary lemmas.
The first is weakening: whenever an expression is well typed in a given context and store, it remains
well typed under further assumptions and additional cells. This is easily proved by induction on typing
derivations.
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LEMMA 3.1 (Weakening).
i. If T :: ;  e e : τ, then , ′; , ′ e e : τ .
ii. If T :: ;  i i : τ, then , ′; , ′ i i : τ .
iii. If T ::  K K : τ1 ⇒ τ2, then , ′ K K : τ1 ⇒ τ2.
iv. If T ::  S S : ¯, then , ′ S S : ¯.
v. If T ::  a a : τ, then , ′ a a : τ .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of T . The parts of this lemma should be proved in
the order they are presented.
The second auxiliary property we need is the substitution lemma: it states that free variables in a
well-typed expression can be substituted for expressions of the same type and the result will be well
typed.
LEMMA 3.2 (Substitution).
i. If T :: ; , x : τ ′ e e : τ and ;  e e′ : τ ′, then ;  e [e′/x]e : τ .
ii. If T :: ; , x : τ ′ i i : τ and ;  e e′ : τ ′, then ;  i [e′/x]i : τ .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of T .
As in the functional case, type preservation ensures that the type of an expression is identical to the
type of its value. Intermediate evaluation steps require us to take into account arbitrary continuations
and stores. We have the following generalization.
THEOREM 3.1 (Type preservation). if S  K  i ↪→ a with ; · i i : τ,  K K : τ ⇒ τ ′, and
 S S : , then  a a : τ ′.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of a derivation of the evaluation judgment and
inversion on the derivations of the typing judgments.
The type preservation result is formalized as follows at the top level of evaluation.
COROLLARY 3.1 (Type preservation). if ·  init  eval e ↪→ a with ·; · e e : τ, then · a a : τ .
3.7. Representation in LLF
In this section, we give an LLF representation of the syntax of MLR, of its static and dynamic semantics,
and show how to exploit the resulting encoding of computations. The representation we propose is a
natural extension of the LF code for Mini-ML found in the literature [33]. In particular, it retains its
structure, its elegance, and the ease of proving its adequacy with respect to the informal presentation we
just concluded. We describe the main issues in the representation by displaying fragments of the code
and a limited number of adequacy statements. A complete treatment can be found in Appendix A. It is
interesting to compare the result of our encoding with similar endeavors in the literature.
VanInwegen used the HOL theorem prover [24] to verify properties about a substantial portion of
Standard ML [52]. She adopted a brute-force approach to the meta-representation problem, encoding,
for example, contexts as terms. This choice resulted in a complex representation and only partial
achievement of the main goal of this endeavor: a formal proof of type preservation for that language.
Although on a much simpler fragment, our use of higher-order abstract syntax, of parametric and
hypothetical judgments, and of the linear features of LLF avoids these difficulties completely.
Chirimar used Forum [34] to represent a language similar to MLR with the addition of exceptions and
continuations [12], but without any emphasis on typing. He took advantage of the higher-order nature
of Forum and of its linear constructs. The resulting program is as elegant as our code and is proved
adequate with respect to the informal specification of the object language. The absence of proof-terms
in Forum prevents the direct manipulation of object-level derivations and no attempt is made to use that
meta-language to investigate meta-theoretic properties such as type preservation.
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3.8. Syntax
The representation of the syntactic level of MLR is based on higher-order abstract syntax and does
not require the expressive power of the linear constructs of LLF. It lies therefore in the LF fragment of
this language.
As is normally done in LF, every syntactic category of the object language is mapped to a distinguished
base type. The type families necessary to encode the syntactic categories of MLR are given by the
following declarations:
exp : type. cell : type.
tp : type. store : type.
instr : type. cv : type.
cont : type. answer : type.
The four declarations on the left encode expressions, instructions, types, and continuations. The four
on the right are needed to represent the imperative features of MLR programs. cell corresponds to the
lexical category of memory cells. cv and store will be used to represent the store. Finally, answer
encodes final answers.
We encode the abstract syntax of MLR expressions, as described in the grammar of Section 3.7,
by means of the representation function -. This function maps every production to an LLF object
constant that, when applied to the representation of the subexpressions that it relates, yields an object
that has type exp. The function - is inductively defined on the left-hand side of the table below (we
have separated out the treatment of the imperative constructs); its right-hand side gives the type of the
constants used in the encoding.
x = x
z = z z : exp.
se = se s : exp -> exp.
case e  = case e case : exp
of z ⇒ e1 e1 -> exp
|s x ⇒ e2 ([x : exp]e2) -> (exp -> exp) -> exp.
〈 〉 = unit unit : exp.
〈e1, e2〉 = pair e1e2 pair : exp -> exp -> exp.
fst e = fst e fst : exp -> exp.
snd e = snd e snd : exp -> exp.
lam x .e = lam ([x :exp]e) lam : (exp -> exp) -> exp.
e1e2 = app e1 e2 app : exp -> exp -> exp.
letval x = e1 = letval e1 letval : exp
in e2 ([x :exp]e2) -> (exp -> exp) -> exp.
letname x = e1 = letname e1 letname : exp
in e2 ([x :exp]e2) -> (exp -> exp) -> exp.
fix x .e = FIX ([x :exp]e) fix : (exp -> exp) -> exp.
c = rf c rf : cell -> exp.
ref e = ref e ref : exp -> exp.
!e = !e ! : exp -> exp.
e1 := e2 = assign e1e2 assign : exp -> exp -> exp.
e1; e2 = seq e1e2 seq : exp -> exp -> exp.
The representation of most expressions reflects directly the abstract syntax of MLR. We take advantage
of higher-order abstract syntax in the representation of cells, variables, and binding constructs of MLR.
Variables are encoded as LLF variables (of type exp). The fact that an object-level construct binds a
variable x in a subexpression e is then modeled by using the λ-abstraction of LLF in order to bind
x in e. Cells appear as hypotheses c:cell in the context of LLF, similarly to free variables. Their
representation as expressions is mediated by the constant rf, which maps entities of type cell to objects
of type exp.
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As an example, consider again the following MLR expression from the previous section:
letname f = ref(lamx .x)
in f := lam x .s x ;
! f 〈 〉
It is represented by the following LLF term of type exp:
letname
(ref (lam ([x]x)))
([f] (seq
(assign f (lam ([x](s x))))
(app (!f) unit)))))
The faithfulness of this representation with respect to the object level syntax of expressions consists
of a number of properties that we summarize in the following adequacy theorem, where 	 corresponds
to the signature in Appendix A:
THEOREM 3.2 (Adequacy of the representation of MLR expressions). The function   above is
a compositional bijection between MLR expression with free variables among x1, . . . , xn and cells
c1, . . . , cm, and canonical LLF objects M such that the judgment
x1 : exp, . . . , xn : exp, c1: cell, . . . , cm : cell 	 M ⇑ exp
is derivable.
Compositionality in this statement means that the representation function commutes with substitution,
i.e., that for every MLR expression e and e′, [e′/x]e = [e′/x]e. It confirms the correct application
of higher-order abstract syntax in our encoding. Note that compositionality is not needed for cells since
they are never subject to substitution.
Due to the complexity of our object language, we do not display the simple but long and somewhat
tedious inductive proof of this statement. The interested reader is referred to [6] for a full treatment; the
proof of a different adequacy statement is sketched at the end of this section. The techniques used in
order to prove adequacy theorems for LLF encodings naturally extend the methods successfully applied
for years in the more restricted setting of LF. In particular, they retain their simplicity in our richer
application area. This contrasts with other proposals, e.g., the treatment of linearity in LF itself [42],
where adequacy theorems have complex proofs even for simple object languages.
Types, instructions, and continuations are represented in a similar way. The LLF declarations for the
constants needed in their encoding can be found in Appendix A. We omit displaying the statements of
the respective adequacy theorems since they do not introduce new concepts. They can be found in [6].
MLR makes a dual usage of the collection of cell-value pairs thta we informally referred to as its store:
as a repository from which to retrieve the value associated with a cell during evaluation (the proper
store we indicated as S), and as a term to be eventually returned with the final answer (the reified store
we denoted [S]). We will correspondingly have two distinct LLF representations of the store. We will
discuss the internal encoding S of a proper store S when considering evaluation. A reified store [S]
is given the following external represention [S]:
[·] = estore estore : store
[S, c = v] = with [S] (holds c v) with : store -> cv -> store.
holds : cell -> exp -> cv.
Here and in the following, we systematically overload the notation   used for expressions to denote
the various representation functions that are required in this example. The nature of its argument should
always permit disambiguating which specific function we are refering to in each case.
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The representation of answers directly expresses the grammatical rules:
([S],v) = close [S] v close : store -> exp -> answer.
new c.a = new ([c: cell]a) new : (cell -> answer) -> answer.
The declarations for these constants are repeated in Appendix A. The adequacy theorems that link
them to the syntax of MLR are reported in [6].
3.9. Static Semantics
On the basis of the above encoding of the syntax of MLR, we will now describe the meta-representation
of the static semantics of this language.
As for syntax, the representation of the static semantics of MLR does not rely on the linear features
of LLF. The resulting code lies therefore in the Elf fragment of our logical framework. We have the
following declarations for the type families that model the various typing judgments presented in
Section 3.2:
tpe : exp -> tp -> type.
tpi : instr -> tp -> type.
tpK : cont -> tp -> tp -> type.
tpc : cell -> tp -> type.
tpS : store -> type.
tpa : answer -> tp -> type.
Again we have separated out the declarations that suffice for the functional core of MLR from the type
families that are required to handle the imperative aspects of this language. The first three represent
the typing judgments for expressions, instructions, and continuations, while tpS and tpa encode re-
spectively the store and answer typing judgments, and tpc records the type of individual cells in the
store.
We illustrate the representation of the static semantics of MLR by displaying how to encode a typing
derivation for expressions. The remaining typing judgments are treated similarly and the resulting LLF
declarations are presented in Appendix A.
In Section 3.2, we denoted the fact that an expression e has type τ assuming the types given in  for its
free variables and the types given in  for its reference cells as the hypothetical judgment ;  e e : τ .
We represent the schematic form of this judgment by means of the LLF type family TPE. This family
accepts two parameters: the representation of an expression and the representation of a type. Therefore,
the instance above will be encoded as the LLF base type tpe e τ. The context  is taken into
consideration only when checking that this term is indeed derivable in LLF. Then, we will encode each
pair xi : τi in  by means of an LLF hypothesis
ti : tpe xi τi,
where the free variable xi is declared as an expression (xi : exp). Similarly, we encode every item c j : τ ′j
in  as the (intuitionistic) assumption
t ′j : tpc c j τ ′j
in the context of LLF, where c j is declared as a cell (c j : cell). Note that tpc only serves the purpose
of making typing assumptions for cells. We write  and  for the encoding we just outlined for
the context  and the store context , respectively.
The inference rules defining the derivability of the typing judgment for MLR are encoded according
to the technique presented in Section 3.1. We consider two rules as additional examples; the remaining
declarations can be found in Appendix A. Rule tpe z associates the type nat to the numeral z. We
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represent it by means of the LF constant tpe z that relate z to nat:

;  e z : nat tpe z = tpe z : tpe z nat.
Rule tpe case specifies how to type-check a conditional expression. We repeat it from Fig. 12:
;  e e : nat ;  e e1 : τ ; , x : nat e e2 : τ
;  e case e of z ⇒ e1 | s x ⇒ e2 : τ tpe case
This rule has multiple premises. It is hypothetical because the rightmost premise inserts the assumption
x : nat into the context. It is also parametric since the variable x is bound in the case construct, but
it appears as a new symbol both in the added hypothesis and in the expression e2 type-checked by
the rightmost premise. We represent this rule by means of the LLF constant tpe case and encode its
structure in the associated type. We have the declaration:
tpe case : tpe E nat
-> tpe E1 T
-> ({x:exp} tpe x nat -> tpe (E2 x) T)
-> tpe (case E E1 ([x:exp] E2 x)) T.
Notice the quantification over x and the embedded implication with antecedent tpe x nat in the
encoding of the third premise. In this declaration, the LLF variables E, E1, E2, and T correspond to
the schematic variables e, e1, e2, and τ , respectively. They are implicitly quantified at the front of the
declaration.
It is worth noticing that there is no declaration in correspondence of rule tpe x:
; , x : τ e x : τ tpe x
Since assumptions are represented directly in the context of LLF, a judgment of the form tpe x T ,
where T is the representation of some concrete type τ , will be validated by accessing the context of
LLF rather than the signature and succeed precisely when tx : tpe x T appears in it as an assumption.
Similar considerations hold for reference cells.
We have now the means for representing derivations of expression typing judgments. The adequacy
theorem below ensures that whenever T is a (valid) derivation for the MLR judgment ;  e e : τ ,
it is a canonical inhabitant of the LLF type tpe e τ with respect to the proper encoding of  and
, and vice versa.
THEOREM 3.3 (Adequacy of the representation of MLR expression typing). Given an MLR expression
e and a type τ, there is a compositional bijection   between derivations of
;  e e : τ
and LLF objects M such that
,  	 M ⇑ tpe e τ
is derivable.
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3.10. Dynamic Semantics
Unlike syntax and static semantics, the representation of evaluation relies heavily on the linear features
of LLF. It is based on the following four type families:
ev : cont -> instr -> answer -> type.
contains : cell -> exp -> type.
collect : store -> type.
read : cell -> exp -> type.
which we will describe in turn.
Assuming the appropriate representation functions   for continuations, instructions, and answers,
we model the continuation-based judgment S  K  i ↪→ a as the LLF base type ev K i a.
The store S mentioned by this judgment is represented in a distributed fashion in the context of LLF.
Each item c = v in S is modeled by two assumptions: first of all, we need to declare c as a cell and
we do so by means of the assumption c:cell; second, we represent the fact that the current contents
of c is v by a linear hypothesis of the form h :ˆ contains c v. The first assumption should clearly be
intuitionistic since c may be mentioned many times in K , i , a, and S. In contrast, the second must be
linear since assignment updates the value associated with a cell destructively. If h were an intuitionistic
hypothesis, we would have no means of prohibiting the old value from being accessed. In summary, we
associate to every proper store S = (c1 = v1, . . . , cn = vn) the following internal representation:
S =
[
c1:cell, . . . , cn:cell,
h1 :ˆ contains c1 v1, . . . , hn :ˆ contains cn vn
]
Four rules in the deductive system for continuation-based evaluation presented in Figs. 14 and 15
access the store directly: ev ref∗, ev assign∗2, ev deref∗, and ev init. We will illustrate the use of the
linear features of LLF on their encoding. However, in order to gain familiarity with our representation
technique, we will first analyze rule ev z. All other inference figures are treated similarly to this rule.
The complete code is displayed in Appendix A.
A bottom up reading of rule ev z, shown below on the left, specifies that evaluating z simply amounts
to returning it as a value. We represent this rule by means of the declaration for the constant ev z shown
on the right:
S  K  return z ↪→ a
S  K  eval z ↪→ a ev z
 =
[
ev z : ev K (return z) A
-o ev K (eval z) A.
The linear arrow in the representation of rule ev z enables its antecedent and its consequent to
access the same linear assumptions in the context. This accounts for the fact that the premise and the
conclusion of this rule mention the same store. Had we used an intuitionistic implication, the antecedent
(and therefore the whole expression) would have been applicable only with contexts deprived of any
linear assumptions, corresponding to empty stores.
Rule ev ref∗, repeated below on the left, creates a new location c in the store and initializes it with the
argument v of ref∗. Its representation on the right models these actions on the context of LLF: the new
cell is intuitionistically assumed when processing the dependent type {c:cell}, while the resolution
of the embedded linear implication has the effect of asserting contains c V in the linear part of the
context. Since this assumption is made linearly, it will be possible to remove it from the context, for
example in order to update the value contained in c in response to an assignment. Notice how the newly
created cell c is bound in the final answer.
(S, c = v)  K  return c ↪→ a
S  K  ref∗ v ↪→ new c.a ev ref
∗  =

ev ref* : ({c:cell} contains c V-o ev K (return (rf c)) (A c))
-o ev K (ref* v) (new ([c:cell] A c)).
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Of the three rules that realize assignment in MLR, only ev assign∗2 accesses the store. The declaration
ev assign*2 below mimics the destructive update of the contents of the cell c (written C in the clause)
in the store in two steps. First the old value is retrieved by contains C V’. Since it appears as a linear
assumption, accessing it causes its removal from the linear context of LLF. Since the other antecedent
of this clause is reached through the multiplicative connective, the remaining linear hypotheses will
be passed to it. This term inserts the new value v (i.e., V) of c in the representation of the store by means
of the antecedent contains C V of the embedded linear implication.
(S, c = v)  K  return 〈 〉 ↪→ a
(S, c = v′)  K  c :=∗2 v ↪→ a
ev assign∗2
 =
[
ev assign*2 : (contains C V -o ev K (return unit) A)
-o (contains C V’ -o ev K (assign*2 (rf C) V) A).
Dereferencing a cell c is naturally modeled in LLF through the use of the additive operators of our
language. In order to encode rule ev deref∗, we need two copies of the store representation: one to
retrieve the contents of c, and one to proceed with the evaluation. This is immediately achieved by
means of the additive conjunction of LLF. We have the following declaration:
S  c = v S  K  return v ↪→ a
S  K  deref∗ c ↪→ a ev deref
∗  =

ev deref
* : (read C V
& ev K (return V) A)
-o ev K (deref* (rf C))A.
The conjunct read C V, which implements the read judgment S  c = v, looks up its copy of the
linear context in search of the assumption contains C V and relies on the additive unit of LLF, written
<T>, to discard the rest. This technique is generally applicable to every situation that involves looking
up the encoding of volatile information. The definition of read consists of a single clause encoding rule
read val:

(S, c = v)  c = v read val
 =

read val : contains C V-o <T>
-o read C V.
We could have alternatively modeled dereferencing similarly to assignment by first accessing the linear
assumption contains C V directly. In order to balance its consequent removal from the linear context
of LLF, this same assumption should be reentered in the context before returning the value V. We would
have the following declaration:
ev deref*’ : (contains C V -o ev K (return V) A)
-o (contains C V -o ev K (deref* (rf C)) A).
Although it achieves a similar effect, this declaration does not encode rule ev deref∗, or read val, or
any combination of these rules. Instead, it is a transliteration of the following inference rule, which we
could have used to formalize dereferencing:
(S, c = v)  K  return v ↪→ a
(S, c = v)  K  deref∗ c ↪→ a ev deref
∗′
Finally, rule ev init pairs up the store and the final value in order to produce the answer. We model
this behavior by means of the auxiliary procedure collect which translates the internal representation
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of the store S, as linear LLF assumptions, to its external representation [S], as an object of type store.

S  init  return v ↪→ ([S], v)ev init
 =
[
ev init : collect S
-o ev init (return V) (close S V).
The code for collect is displayed below.
col empty : collect estore.
col cv : contains C V
-o collect S
-o collect (with S (holds C V)).
Since the use of multiplicatives removes the assumptions contains C V as they are retrieved, each
recursive access to collect adds a different item to the external representation of the store. Clause
col empty is provable only when the linear part of the context of LLF is empty and therefore only
when the complete store of MLR has been externalized.
The effectiveness of the representation we just illustrated relies on the ability to remove objects from
the context of LLF. Using LF on this problem would have produced awkward encodings with prohibitive
consequence for the development of the meta-theory of MLR [6]: a first alternative would have relied
entirely on the external representation of the store, implementing all the operations required to access
and modify it explicitly. A second alternative would be to proceed as we did, with the tedious addition
of declarations aimed at checking the linearity of the resulting derivations a posteriori.
We will now make the above motivating discussion more precise. The faithfulness of our represen-
tation of evaluation is expressed by the following adequacy theorem.
THEOREM 3.4 (Adequacy of the representation of MLR evaluation). Given an MLR continuation K,
an instruction i, a store S, and an answer a, where K, i, S, and a are closed except for the possible
presence of free cells, there is a bijection   between derivations of
S  K  i ↪→ a
and LLF objects M such that
S 	 M ⇑ ev K i a
is derivable.
In order to prove the above theorem, we will decompose it into four parts. Again, 	 is the signature
contained in Appendix A. We need to prove the following properties:
Functionality:   is a total function from MLR evaluation derivations to LLF objects over 	.
Soundness: The representation of a derivation of a given MLR evaluation judgment is an LLF
object whose type is the representation of this judgment.
Completeness: Whenever a canonical LLF object over 	 inhabits the type corresponding to
the encoding of an MLR evaluation judgment, this object is the representation of a derivation of that
judgment.
Bijectivity:   is a bijection between evaluation derivations in MLR and canonical LLF objects
whose type encodes the corresponding evaluation judgment.
Different from expressions and typing derivations, the representation function   is trivially composi-
tional (it involves closed expressions only); otherwise, we should prove it as an additional property.
Detailed proofs of these properties are long and rather tedious, although conceptually simple. We
will sketch them by using the declaration for ev assign*2 as a representative case. In order to do so,
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we repeat it complete with the -quantifiers we omitted in the above presentation:
ev assign*2 : {C:cell}{V’:exp} {V:exp}{K:cont}{A:answer}
(contains C V -o ev K (return unit) A)
-o (contains C V’ -o ev K (assign*2 (rf C) V) A).
In the specific case of this example, it is convenient to state and prove the functionality and soundness
properties together. We have the following result:
LEMMA 3.3 (Functionality and soundness of MLR evaluation’s representation). Given a store S, a
continuation K, an instruction i, and an answer a, where K, i, S, and a are closed except for the possible
presence of free cells, for every derivation E of the judgment S  K  i ↪→ a, E is defined and
unique, and the LLF judgment
S 	 E ⇑ ev K i a
is derivable.
Proof. This proof proceeds by induction on the structure of the derivation E . We illustrate only the
case in which it ends with an application of rule ev assign∗2. Therefore,
E ′
E = (S
∗, c = v)  K  return 〈 〉 ↪→ a
(S∗, c = v′)  K  c :=∗2 v ↪→ a
ev assign∗2
where S = (S∗, c = v′) and i = (c :=∗2 v). Let us also denote as S′ the store (S∗, c = v). Notice that
S = S′.
By the induction hypothesis onE ′, we deduce that there is a unique LLF object M ′ such that M ′ = E ′
and there is a derivation of the judgment S′ 	 M ′ ⇑ ev K (return unit) a.
Iterated applications of the LLF rule oa iapp are used to instantiate the arguments of the declaration
for ev assign*2. Indeed, there is an atomic derivation A′′ of the following judgment:
S′ 	 ev assign*2 c v′vKa
↓


(contains c v
-o ev K (return unit) a)
-o(contains c v′
-o evK (assign*2(rf c) v) a)


Let t :ˆ contains c v be the assumption in S′ corresponding to the pair (c = v) in S′. We can
abstract it over M ′ in the LLF derivation for this object, obtaining a derivation C ′′ of the judgment
S∗ 	 ˆλt : contains c v.M ′ ⇑ (contains c v  ev K (return unit) a), where S∗
differs from S′ only by the removal of assumption t . Since S′= S∗, we can then apply rule
oa lapp to A′′ and C ′′, obtaining a derivation A′ of:
S∗ 	 ev assign*2 cv′ v K aˆ(ˆλt : contains cv.M ′)
↓ (contains cv′ -o evK(assign*2(rf c)v)a)
Let t ′ :ˆ contains cv′ be the assumption in S corresponding to the pair (c = v′) in the
store S. Then, there is a derivation C ′ of the LLF judgment (S′∗, t ′ :ˆ contains cv′)  	 t ′ ⇑
contains cv′. We can then apply rule oa lapp again to A′ and C ′ to obtain a derivation A of:
S∗, t ′ :ˆ contains cv′ 	
ev assign*2 cv′ v K aˆ(ˆλt : contains cv.M ′) ˆ t ′
↓ ev K( assign*2(rf c)v)a
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In order to understand this formula, observe that S = (S∗, t ′ :ˆ contains cv′). We now apply
rule oc a to A to get the desired canonical derivation.
At this point, it is enough to notice that the LLF object M appearing on the left of the arrow in this
canonical judgment is the representation of the MLR derivation E above and that the type on the right
of the arrow is the representation of its type. It is also easy to ascertain that M is unique, given the
uniquenees of M ′.
We now consider the completeness of the encoding of MLR evaluation derivations. We have the
following lemma.
LEMMA 3.4 (Completeness of the representation of MLR evaluation). Given a store S, a continuation
K , an instruction i, and an answer a, where K , i, S, and a are closed except for the possible presence
of free cells, for every LLF object M such that the judgment
S 	 M ⇑ ev K i a
has a derivation C, there is a derivation E of the MLR judgment S  K  i ↪→ a such that M = E.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of M . Since the type in C is a base type, M can
either be a constant, a variable, or start with a destructor. Then M has the following structure
M = cM ∗M1 ∗ · · · ∗ Mn,
where cM is a constant in 	 of some appropriate type, ∗ represents either linear or intuitionistic appli-
cation, and M1, . . . , Mn are objects of some type. The proof now distinguishes cases on the basis of
possible constants cM . We consider only the case in which this constant is ev assign*2.
If cM is ev assign*2, then it must be the case that i = (c :=∗2 v) for some cell c and expression v,
and moreover
M = ev assign*2 c Mv′v K a ˆ M∗ˆ Mt ′ .
By analyzing the types of the objects Mv′ , M∗, and Mt ′ , we deduce that there is an expression
v′ such that Mv′ = v′, that M∗ = ˆλt : contains cv.M ′ for some term M ′ of type ev
K (return unit) a, and that Mt ′ = t ′ for some linear assumption t ′ :ˆ contains c v′.
Moreover, we have that S = (S∗, c = v′).
We can apply the induction hypothesis on M ′ relative to a store representation that differs from S
by the replacement of assumption t ′ with t . The corresponding MLR store S′ is (S∗, c = v). We deduce
in this way that there exists a derivation E ′ of the judgment (S∗, c = v)  K  return 〈 〉 ↪→ a. An
application of rule ev assign∗2 suffices to obtain the desired derivation.
We conclude the treatment of the adequacy of the representation of MLR evaluation derivations by
showing that the function - is indeed bijective.
LEMMA 3.5 (Bijectivity of the representation of MLR evaluation). Given a store S, a continuation
K , an instruction i, and an answer a, where K , i, S, and a are closed except for the possible presence
of free cells, the representation function - is a bijection between derivations E of MLR the judgment
S  K  i ↪→ a, and LLF objects of type ev K i a in the context S.
Proof. Lemma 3.3 establishes that - is a total function from the set of MLR derivations mentioned
in the statement to the specified set of LLF objects. By the completeness lemma, we deduce that
this function is surjective. It therefore remains solely to prove that it is also injective. Given two
derivations E1 and E2 such that E1 = E2, the proof that E1 = E2 proceeds by induction on these
derivations.
A derivation E for an evaluation judgment S  K  i ↪→ a is a trace of the computation that a
continuation-based MLR interpreter performs when evaluating the instruction i and the continuation K
to the final answer a with respect to the store contents S. According to the above adequacy theorem, such
derivations are faithfully represented by the terms M inhabiting the LLF type encoding this judgment.
We conclude this section by illustrating how to take advantage of this internal representation of MLR
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computations. We only give a small example here—more interesting examples such as the proof of type
preservation or a cut elimination procedure for classical linear logic can be found in [6]. Specifically,
we will give LLF declarations that permit counting the number of reference cells dynamically allocated
during the evaluation.
In order to achieve this purpose, we first give the following declarations for natural numbers:
num : type.
zero : num.
succ : num -> num.
The counting judgment relates an MLR computation to the number of cells it allocates. It is represented
by the following type family
count : ev K I A -> num -> type.
We implement the counting procedure in LLF by unfolding the representation of an MLR computation.
We ignore the steps that do not allocate memory cells, but increment by one the counter every time rule
ev ref ∗ is applied. We show three declarations, corresponding to the initialization step performed by
rule ev init, the allocation of a new cell by rule ev ref ∗, and one of the numerous cases where nothing
happens (rule ev z):
cnt init : count (ev init ^ C) zero.
cnt ref∗ : ({c:cell} {d:contains c V} count (C c ^ d) N)
-> count (ev ref∗ ^ ([c:cell] [d^contains c V]
C c d^)) (succ N).
cnt z : count C N
-> count (ev z ^ C) N.
We conclude this section by displaying the LLF base type that ascertains that the MLR expression
letname f = ref (lam x .x)
in f := lam x . s x ;
! f 〈 〉
allocates two cells. The concrete syntax of this term is as follows, where the first argument is the
representation of the evaluation of the above expression:
count
(ev letname ^
(ev seq ^
(ev assign ^
(ev ref ^
(ev lam ^
(ev cont ^
(ev ref∗ ^
[c1:cell] [Cn1 ^ contains c1 (lam [x:exp] x)] ev cont ^
(ev assign∗1 ^
(ev lam ^
(ev cont ^
(ev assign*2 ^
([Cn1’ ^ contains c1 (lam [x:exp] s x)] ev cont ^
(ev app ^
(ev deref ^
(ev ref ^
(ev lam ^
(ev cont ^
(ev ref∗ ^
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([c2:cell] [Cn2 ^ contains c2 (lam [x:exp] x)] ev cont ^
(ev deref∗ ^
(read val ^ ( ) ^ Cn2,
ev cont ^
(ev app∗ ^
(ev unit ^
(ev cont ^
(ev unit ^
(ev init ^ (col cv ^ Cn2 ^ (col cv ^ Cn1’ ^ col empty)))
)))))))))))))) ^ Cn1)))))))))))) (succ (succ zero))
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented the linear logical framework LLF as an extension of LF with internal
support for the representation of state-based problems. We have demonstrated its expressive power
by providing a usable representation of the syntax and the semantics of an imperative variant of the
functional programming language Mini-ML; space reasons prevented us from extending this encoding
to aspects of the meta-theory of this language, such as a proof of its type preservation property [6].
Additional substantial case studies we have completed include the formalization of a proof of cut
elimination for classical linear logic and translations between minimal linear natural deduction and
sequent calculus, as well as a number of puzzles and solitaires. The interested reader may access them
on the World Wide Web at [9] or in [6].
The representation language of LLF, λ&, conservatively extends LF’s λ with constructs from
linear logic. We can think of it as the type theory obtained from the type constructors , &,, and
. This choice of constructors is complete in the sense that they suffice to represent full intuitionistic
or classical linear logic. Further, adding any other linear connective as a free type constructor destroys
the property that usable canonical forms exist by introducing commuting conversions. This property is
necessary in the proofs of adequacy theorems for encodings and also for the interpretation of LLF as
an abstract logic programming language.
The meta-representation methodology of LLF extends the judgments-as-types technique adopted in
LF with a direct way to map state-related constructs and behaviors onto the linear operators of λ&.
The resulting representations retain the elegance and immediacy that characterize LF encodings and
the ease of proving their adequacy.
LLF maintains the computational nature of LF as an abstract logic programming language. The
implementation of LLF combines the experience with higher-order logic programming languages gained
with Elf [38, 41], an older realization of LF, on previous research work on linearity as in the language
Lolli [8, 28], and on new experimental term representation [11] and compilation [7] techniques. Among
the new problems is the necessity of performing higher-order unification between linear terms [10].
LLF generalizes other formalisms based on linear logic such as Forum [34] by making linear objects
available for representations, by permitting proof terms, and by providing linear types. It is closely
related to the system RLF of Ishtiaq and Pym [30], which allows dependencies on linear variables,
but does not have  as an operator. Linear dependent types are potentially useful but not essential in
our experience, while  is a necessary tool in many representation problems. The meta-theory of LLF
appears significantly simpler than that of RLF, a fact that might imply that proving the adequacy of an
encoding may be substantially more complex in this formalism. Finally, our approach is orthogonal to
general logics in the style of LU [22].
In the near future, we intend to gain experience with the use of LLF as a representation language
by encoding state-based deductive systems such as imperative programming languages constructs,
hardware systems, security protocols, and real-time systems. The availability of an implementation will
be of great help in doing so since it will enable us to concentrate on high-level representation issues. We
would also like to extend the tools available in Twelf [46, 48], notably the theorem proving component
of this system [47], to handle the possibilities offered by the linear operators of LLF. Finally, we are
interested in investigating a generalization of the type constructors & and of λ& to linear 	 and
 types, respectively, although it currently appears that this would greatly complicate the type theory
while it is not clear how much would be gained.
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APPENDIX A
Formalization of MLR
A.1. Syntax
exp : type.
tp : type.
instr : type.
cont : type.
cell : type.
cv : type.
store : type.
answer : type.
% Expressions
z : exp.
s : exp -> exp.
case : exp -> exp -> (exp -> exp) -> exp.
unit : exp.
pair : exp -> exp -> exp.
fst : exp -> exp.
snd : exp -> exp.
lam : (exp -> exp) -> exp.
app : exp -> exp -> exp.
letval : exp -> (exp -> exp) -> exp.
letname : exp -> (exp -> exp) -> exp.
fix : (exp -> exp) -> exp.
rf : cell -> exp.
ref : exp -> exp.
! : exp -> exp.
seq : exp -> exp -> exp.
assign : exp -> exp -> exp.
% Types
nat : tp.
one : tp.
cross : tp -> tp -> tp.
arrow : tp -> tp -> tp.
tref : tp -> tp.
% Instructions
eval : exp -> instr.
return : exp -> instr.
case* : exp -> exp -> (exp -> exp) -> instr.
pair* : exp -> exp ->instr.
fst* : exp -> instr.
snd* : exp -> instr.
app* : exp -> exp -> instr.
ref* : exp -> instr.
deref* : exp -> instr.
assign*1 : exp -> exp -> instr.
assign*2 : exp -> exp -> instr.
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% Continuations
init : cont.
klam : cont -> (exp -> instr) -> cont.
% Store
estore : store.
with : store -> cv -> store.
holds : cell -> exp -> cv.
% Answers
close : store -> exp -> answer.
new : (cell -> answer) -> answer.
A.2. Typing
tpc : cell -> tp -> type.
tpe : exp -> tp -> type.
tpi : instr -> tp -> type.
tpK : cont -> tp -> tp -> type.
tpS : store -> type.
tpa : answer -> tp -> type.
% Expressions
tpe z : tpe z nat.
tpe s : tpe E nat.
-> tpe (s E) nat.
tpe case : tpe E nat
-> tpe E1 T
-> ({x : exp} tpe x nat -> tpe (E2 x) T)
-> tpe (case E E1 E2) T.
tpe unit : tpe unit one.
tpe pair : tpe E1 T1
-> tpe E2 T2
-> tpe (pair E1 E2) (cross T1 T2).
tpe fst : tpe E (cross T1 T2)
-> tpe (fst E) T1.
tpe snd : tpe E (cross T1 T2)
-> tpe (snd E) T2.
tpe lam : ({x : exp} tpe x T1 ->tpe (E x) T2)
-> tpe (lam E) (arrow T1 T2).
tpe app : tpe E1 (arrow T2 T1)
-> tpe E2 T2
-> tpe (app E1 E2) T1.
tpe letval : tpe E1 T1
-> ({x : exp}tpe x T1 -> tpe (E2 x) T2)
-> tpe (latval E1 E2) T2.
tpe letname : tpe (E2 E1) T
-> tpe (letname E1 E2) T.
tpe fix : ({x : exp} tpe x T -> tpe (E x) T)
-> tpe (fix E) T.
tpe cell : tpc C T
-> tpe (rf C) (tref T).
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tpe ref : tpe E T
-> tpe (ref E) (tref T).
tpe deref : tpe E (tref T)
-> tpe (! E) T.
tpe seq : tpe E1 T1.
-> tpe E2 T2
-> tpe (seq E1 E2) T2.
tpe assign : tpe E1 (tref T)
-> tpe E2 T
-> tpe (assign E1 E2) one.
% Instructions
tpi eval : tpe E T
-> tpi (eval E) T.
tpi return : tpe V T
-> tpi (return V) T.
tpi case* : tpe V nat
-> tpe E1 T
-> ({x : exp} tpe x nat -> tpe (E2 x) T)
-> tpi (case* V E1 E2) T.
tpi pair* : tpe V T1
-> tpe E T2
-> tpi (pair* V E) (cross T1 T2).
tpi fst* : tpe V (cross T1 T2)
-> tpi (fst* V) T1.
tpi snd* : tpe V (cross T1 T2)
-> tpi (snd* V) T2.
tpi app* : tpe V (arrow T2 T1)
-> tpe E T2
-> tpi (app* V E) T1.
tpi ref* : tpe V T
-> tpi (ref* V) (tref T).
tpi deref* : tpe V (tref T)
-> tpi (deref* V) T.
tpi assign*1 : tpe V (tref T)
-> tpe E T
-> tpi (assign*1 V E) one.
tpi assign*2 : tpe V1 (tref T)
-> tpe V2 T
-> tpi (assign*2 V1 V2) one.
% Continuations
tpK init : tpK init T T.
tpK lam : ({x : exp} tpe x T1 -> tpi (I x) T)
-> tpK K T T2
-> tpK (klam K I) T1 T2.
% Store
tpS empty : tpS estore.
tpS with : tpS S
-> tpc C T
-> tpe V T
-> tpS (with S (holds C V)).
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% Answers
tpa close : tpS S
-> tpe V T
-> tpa (close S V) T.
tpa new : ({c : cell}tpc c T’ -> tpa (A c) T)
-> tpa (new A) T.
A.3. Evaluation
%%% Contents of a cell
contains: cell -> exp -> type.
% Only run-time assumptions
%%% Collection of all the cells in the store
collect: store -> type.
col empty : collect estore.
col cv : contains C V
-o collect S
-o collect (with S (holds C V)).
%%% Reading the value of a cell from the store
read : cell -> exp -> type.
read val : contains C V
-o <T>
-o read C V.
%%% Evaluation
ev : cont -> instr -> answer -> type.
% Expressions
ev z : ev K (return z) A
-o ev K (eval z) A.
ev s : ev (klam K ([x : exp] return (s x))) (eval E) A
-o ev K (eval (s E)) A.
ev case : ev (klam K ([x : exp] case* x E1 E2)) (eval E) A
-o ev K (eval (case E E1 E2)) A.
ev unit : ev K (return unit) A
-o ev K (eval unit) A.
ev pair : ev (klam K ([x : exp] pair* x E2)) (eval E1) A
-o ev K (eval (pair E1 E2)) A.
ev fst : ev (klam K ([x : exp] fst* x)) (eval E) A
-o ev K (eval (fst E)) A.
ev snd : ev (klam K ([x : exp] and* x)) (eval E) A
-o ev K (eval (snd E)) A.
ev lam : ev K (return (lam E)) A
-o ev K (eval (1am E)) A.
ev app : ev (klam K ([x : exp] app* x E2)) (eval E1) A
-o ev K (eval (app E1 E2)) A.
ev letval : ev (klam K ([x : exp] eval (E2 x))) (eval E1) A
-o ev K (eval (letval E1 E2)) A.
ev letname : ev K (eval (E2 E1)) A
-o ev K (eval (letname E1 E2)) A.
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ev fix : ev K (eval (E (fix E))) A
-o ev K (eval (fix E)) A.
ev cell : ev K (return (rf C)) A
-o ev K (eval (rf C)) A.
ev ref : ev (klam K ([x : exp] ref* x)) (eval E) A
-o ev K (eval (ref E)) A.
ev deref : ev (klam K ([x : exp] deref* x)) (eval E) A
-o ev K (eval (! E)) A.
ev seq : ev (klam K ([x : exp] eval E2)) (eval E1) A
-o ev K (eval (seq E1 E2)) A.
ev assign : ev (klam K ([x : exp] assign*1 x E2)) (eval E1) A
-o ev K (eval (assign E1 E2)) A.
% Values
ev init : collect S
-o ev init (return V) (close S V).
ev cont : ev K (I V) A
-o ev (klam K I) (return V) A.
% Auxiliary instructions
ev case*1 : ev K (eval E1) A
-o ev K (case* z E1 E2) A.
ev case*2 : ev K (eval (E2 V)) A
-o ev K (case* (s V) E1 E2) A.
ev pair* : ev (klam K ([x : exp] return (pair V x))) (eval E) A
-o ev K (pair* V E) A.
ev fst* : ev K (return V1) A
-o ev K (fst* (pair V1 V2)) A.
ev snd* : ev K (return V2) A
-o ev K (snd* (pair V1 V2)) A.
ev app* : ev (klam K ([x : exp] eval (E1 x))) (eval E2) A
-o ev K (app* (lam E1) E2) A.
ev ref* : ({c : cell}contains c V -o ev K (return(rf c))(A c))
-o ev K (ref* V) (new A).
ev deref* : (read C V ev K (return V) A)
-o ev K (deref* (rf C)) A.
ev assign*1 : ev (klam K ([x : exp] assign*2 (rf C) x)) (eval E) A
-o ev K (assign*1 (rf C) E) A.
ev assign*2 : (contains C V -o ev K (return unit) A)
-o (contains C V’ -o ev K (assign*2 (rf C) V) a).
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